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REVOLUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: CHIEF JUSTICE

HOLT'S OPINION IN C/TY OFLONDON V WOOD
Philip A. Hamburger*
In 1702, in an opinion touching upon parliamentary power, Chief
Justice Sir John Holt discussed limitations on government in language
that has long seemed more intriguing than clear. Undoubtedly, the
Chief Justice was suggesting limitations on government-limitations that
subsequently have become quite prominent, particularly in America. Yet
even the best report of his opinion concerning these constraints has left
historians in some doubt as to just what he was saying and why it was
significant.'
The case in which ChiefJustice Holt was so obscure about matters of
such importance, City of London v. Wood, 2 revived the old maxim that a
person could not be judge in his own case. The defendant, Thomas
Wood, had declined to serve as a sheriff for the City of London. In response, the City brought an action of debt to recover the penalty in the
Mayor's Court, formally composed of the Mayor and Aldermen. As was
customary, the City brought this action in the name of the Mayor, commonalty, and citizens of London. Although Wood was held liable by the
Mayor's Court, he eventually had the judgment overturned by three royal
judges sitting at Guildhall, who argued, among other things, that the
Mayor could not be judge in his own case.
According to the most substantial printed report, Chief Justice Holt
discussed the parliamentary implications of the prohibition against being
both judge and party:
* Professor of Law and Legal History, The National Law Center, The George
Washington University; J.D. 1982, Yale; B.A. 1979, Princeton. The author very gratefully
acknowledges the generous financial support of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation
and the thoughtful, learned comments of Richard Ashcraft,Jacob I. Corre, Richard S. Kay,
Jacqueline Newell, Lois G. Schwoerer, Patricia Springborg, Robert W. Tuttle, and the
participants in the Legal Theory Workshop, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Permission to
publish excerpts from manuscripts in the custody of the City of London Record Office and
the Trustees of the British Library is also acknowledged with gratitude.
1. See Carleton K. Allen, Law in the Making 433-34 (1958); John W. Gough,
Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History 9-11 (reprint 1985) (1955); Charles
H. Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament and Its Supremacy 307 (1910); Edward S.
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev.
149, 376 (1928); Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case andJudicial Review, 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 30 (1926); Frederick Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation, 39 L.Q. Rev. 163,
165 (1923).
2. 12 Mod. 669, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (1702).
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[I] t is against all laws that the same person should be party and
Judge in the same cause, for it is manifest contradiction ....

And what my Lord Coke says in Dr.Bonham's case in his 8 Co[ke's
Reports] is far from any extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable
and true saying, that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that
the same person should be party and Judge, or, which is the
same thing, Judge in his own cause, it would be a void Act of
Parliament; for it is impossible that one should be Judge and
party, for the Judge is to determine between party and party, or
between the Government and the party; and an Act of
Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things
that look pretty odd; for it may discharge one from his allegiance to the Government he lives under, and restore him to the
state of nature; but it cannot
make one that lives under a Gov3
ernment Judge and party.
In his report of Bonham's Case,4 Coke had asserted that a statute making a
person judge in his own case would be void if not interpreted to avert the
contradiction, 5 and almost a century later, in City ofLondon v. Wood, Holt
appears to have followed Coke's example. Yet if Holt was attempting to
say something about limitations on government, he might have been less
enigmatic than to say that Parliament could restore a person "to the state
of nature" or that an act of Parliament "can do no wrong" but, nonetheless, might be "void."
Fortunately, it is not necessary to rely upon these cryptic allusions in
the printed reports. Holt's own manuscript report of his opinion has survived, and this new evidence reveals that he discussed two types of limitation on government. First, Holt argued that government-including
even a representative institution such as Parliament-was subject to natural law. According to Holt, if Parliament violated the limitations implied
3. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, at 687-88, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1602; see also Holt, K.B. 396, 396, 90
Eng. Rep. 1118, 1118, 1 Salk. 397, 397-98, 91 Eng. Rep. 344, 344-45. According to the

report in Holt, KB., the judges gave their opinions at Guildhall on "March 2, 1701"-i.e.,
1702 new style.
4. 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (KB. 1610).

5. According to Coke's report:
The censors cannot be judges, ministers, and parties;judges to give sentence or

judgment... And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law
will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void:
for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant,
or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge
such Act to be void ....
8 Co. Rep. 114, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610). Professor Samuel Thorne has

suggested that Coke took a relatively modest position that focused on a problem of
statutory interpretation. See S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, in Essays in English Legal
History 269, 275-76 (1985). In contrast, Professor Charles Gray has argued that Coke at

least reported his position in a way that attributed to the judges a more ambitious role. See
Charles M. Gray, Bonham's Case Reviewed, 116 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc'y 35, 35-36 (1972),

Professor D.E.C. Yale has noted that Coke applied to Parliament a doctrine that had earlier
been applied to the king. See D.E.C. Yale, Judex in PropriaCausa: An Historical Excursus,
33 Cambridge L.J. 80, 92 (1974).
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by natural law, it would be dissolved, and individuals living under it would
be returned to the state of nature. In this way, the ChiefJustice suggested
extrajudicial, even revolutionary restraints on government. Second, Holt
acknowledged that the judiciary could not employ judicial review to void
acts of Parliament. On the basis of ideas of sovereign power related to his
understanding of natural law, Holt treated judicial review as a mechanism
that enforced and deferred to the acts of a body with sovereign power.
Under England's parliamentary system of government, Holt's version of
judicial review could not void acts of legislation, but it at least required
the government to exercise its power by means of such acts and so by
means of law. Thus, whether with respect to natural law and extrajudicial
restraints or with respect to sovereign power and judicial review, Holt
strove to establish that government, even representative government, was
subject to law. Almost three hundred years later, his opinion remains a
profound exploration of the lawfulness of government and of the capacity of law to restrain government.
Beyond its significance as an examination of law and limited government, Holt's opinion can illuminate some important historical developments and controversies. First, Holt's account of natural law and the possibility of a dissolution of government marks a crucial transition in AngloAmerican constitutional developments. Following a century of turmoil in
which two revolutions established Parliament's supremacy over the
Crown, Holt recognized that the most vital constitutional questions would
no longer concern limitations on monarchical power. Instead, as Holt
clearly understood, constitutional controversies would now increasingly
involve limitations on the power of Parliament-a representative institution. On this account, the notion of the power of the people acquired a
prominence that remains with us and that has changed the very nature of
our constitutional law.
More broadly, Holt's opinion suggests the need to reconsider the
early eighteenth-century reception of natural-law ideas. Many notable
historians have depreciated the historical importance of modern naturallaw ideas, particularly the Lockean versions of such ideas, which justified
limitations on government, including, ultimately, revolution. These
scholars have argued-indeed, have established as historical orthodoxythat modern natural-law theories, especially the ideas ofJohn Locke, had
a relatively insignificant role in eighteenth-century political debates and
that, even when mentioned, such ideas were employed in an unsophisticated, "unthinking" way. John G.A. Pocock, for example, has written
about the "myth" of Locke and has emphasized that a large part of eighteenth-century political discourse does "not necessitate reference to Locke
at all." 6 Even a well-known critic of this approach, Isaac Kramnick, has
6. J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and
History 144 (1971); see J.G.A. Pocock, The Myth of John Locke and the Obsession with
Liberalism, in John Locke 3, 6-8 (J.G.A. Pocock & Richard Ashcraft eds., 1980). The
literature that adopts this perspective is too vast to be enumerated here. See, e.g., J.P.
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written that it "is on solid ground" to the extent it "de-emphasizes the
role of Lockean ideas in the early eighteenth century." 7 Other historians,
however, have begun to question whether Lockean ideas were, in fact, so
insignificant prior to mid-century, and Holt's opinion confirms their
doubts.8 In his analysis of natural-law limitations on government, Holt
appears to have drawn upon the ideas of Locke and other contemporary
philosophers, and therefore his opinion corroborates the need for a
broad re-evaluation of the reception of such ideas and of their role in the
development of modern constitutional analysis.
Indeed, Holt's discussion of natural law suggests much about the relationship between the dissemination of political ideas and the diffusion
of political authority. It provides an opportunity to observe the transmission of ideas from Locke and other philosophers to judges such as Holt,
Kenyon, Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party, 1689-1720, at 17-20 (1977);J.G.A.
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law 237, 335 (1987); Donald Winch,
Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision 28-29, 36, 41, 180 (1978);

Martyn P. Thompson, The Reception of Locke's Two Treatises of Government 1690-1705,
24 Pol. Stud. 184 (1976). In particular, Pocock and others have suggested that analysis
based on notions of the law of nature and the state of nature played only a small role in the
Revolution of 1688 or the subsequent constitutional settlement. In defense of this
position, they seem to assume that "liberal" and "republican" ideas tended to be quite
distinct in eighteenth-century political discussion, as if they were not intimately
interconnected. Although this issue cannot be pursued in detail here, it should suffice for
purposes of this essay to note the combination of "liberal" and "republican" ideas in the
works of Sidney, Toland and vast numbers of other "republican" writers during the
following century. In this context, to tease apart purely "republican" and purely "liberal"
strands and then dramatically say that the republican threads constituted a "discourse" that
can be understood without reference to the Lockean or "liberal" threads is rather
troubling.
More generally, it has been suggested by numerous historians that the elaborate
arguments of Locke and other natural-law writers typically were reduced to mere catchphrases and rarely were employed in a more sophisticated way. See, e.g., J.G.A. Pocock,
Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History 5-6, 25-27 (1971)
(citing Dunn); John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the
Eighteenth Century, in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives 45 (John W. Yolton ed.,
1969). For other examples, see the extensive literature critiqued by Ralph Lerner, The
Thinking Revolutionary 1-16 (1987).
7. Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 Am. Hist. Rev. 629, 630
(1982).
8. A number of distinguished authors have suggested more complex accounts that
acknowledge the substantial role ofJohn Locke and other natural-law writers. See, e.g.,
Alan C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America
3-8, passim (1991); Richard Ashcraft & M.M. Goldsmith, Locke, Revolution Principles, and
the Formation of Whig Ideology, 26 Hist. J. 773 (1983); Mark Goldie, The Revolution of
1689 and the Structure of Political Argument, 83 Bull. Res. Human. 473, 486-87, 490,
508-09 (1980); Jeffrey M. Nelson, Unlocking Locke's Legacy, 26 Pol. Stud. 101 (1978);
Lois G. Schwoerer, The Right to Resist: Whig Resistance Theory 1688 to 1694, in Political
Discourse in Early Modem Britain 232, 233 (Nicholas Phillipson & Quentin Skinner eds.,
1993); Lois G. Schwoerer, Locke, Lockean Ideas, and the Glorious Revolution, 51 J. Hist.

Ideas 531 (1990). As will be seen, Holt's opinion in City of London v. Wood similarly
suggests that such ideas were far from dormant and that at least some lawyers and judges
could make relatively sophisticated use of political theory.
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to journalists such as Daniel Defoe, and through at least the journalists, to
a much wider reading public. As Defoe and even the more judicious Holt
seem to have understood, their ideas about limitations on government
could be effective only if transmitted and made persuasive to the people
who might have to implement such limitations.
Holt's examination of the second type of limitation on government-judicial review-also has important historical implications, for it
suggests the clarity with which judicial review could be linked to ideas of
sovereignty already in 1702. Thus far, historians have tended to conclude
that Holt adopted Coke's position in Bonham's Case-that judges could
declare statutes "void"-but that Holt inconsistently combined this ':judicial review" with a recognition of parliamentary sovereignty. Assuming
that the origins of judicial review were to be found in Bonham's Case, historians on both sides of the Atlantic have taken for granted that the lateseventeenth century triumph of parliamentary power put an end to the
possibility of judicial review in England. Yet, if the Revolution of 1688
and the Revolutionary Settlement finally resolved the contest between
Crown and Parliament by leaving Parliament sovereign, how, these historians have asked, could Holt have seriously suggested judicial review?
Failing to consider the possibility that Holt was discussing a limitation on government different from that in which they were interested,
historians have assumed that either the ChiefJustice or, more generously,
the reporter was confused. Professor Theodore F.T. Plucknett wrote that
"[t] he judgment of Lord ChiefJustice Holt shows clearly how perplexed
he was."9 Plucknett concluded his extensive quotations from the printed
report by observing: "Such is the sad state of wreckage to which Lord
Coke's stately theory had been reduced after the successive hurricanes of
the Great Rebellion and the Glorious Revolution."1 ° In mercifully less
windy prose, Professor Edward S. Corwin similarly asserted that the opinion took an inconsistent position somewhere between the ideas of Coke
and modern conceptions of parliamentary sovereignty. Corwin asked:
What precisely does Holt mean by the word "impossible" here?
....In the one case the restraint on the act of Parliament is still
the higher law, in other it is not. The question cannot be resolved further than to say that Holt, like Blackstone later, seems
to be attempting to bridge the gap between two conflicting theories of law."1
Without dissenting from his predecessors' disparagement of the opinion,
Sir Carleton Allen attempted to shift responsibility to the reporter, arguing with lawyerly logic that "[t]he whole judgement, as reported, is so confused that it is impossible to believe that it represents what a great judge
really said."' 2 To this, John W. Gough retorted sharply that the reporter
9. Plucknett, supra note 1, at 54.
10. Id. at 56.
11. Corwin, supra note 1, at 376.
12. Allen, supra note 1, at 434 n.1.
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may have been muddled but no more so than Holt, who, Gough insisted,
"was perplexed by the questions involved, and wavered in his judgement
between the older and the more modern view."' 3 According to these historians, either Holt or, perhaps, the reporter inconsistently combined judicial review with parliamentary sovereignty-a confusion that reflected a
transition in ideas ofjudicial review at this period.
In fact, Holt was far from confused, and he articulated an account of
judicial review clearly based on modern notions of sovereignty rather
than on Coke's suggestion in Bonham's Case that courts could declare statutes "void." Working from a notion of sovereignty connected to his modem ideas of natural law, Holt reasoned that courts were obliged to enforce the acts of a body with sovereign power. Although Holt's version of
judicial review therefore could not be used to void acts of Parliament, it
implied that Parliament had to exercise its sovereign power by means of
such acts. This penetrating account of judicial review as involving the
recognition and enforcement of the acts of a body with sovereign power
had little connection to Coke's voiding of statutes. Far from reflecting
confusion about the supremacy of Parliament, Holt's opinion acknowledged the power of Parliament but did so in a way that required
Parliament to exert its power lawfully.
To summarize, in a judicial opinion, one of the greatest of English
judges rejected judicial review of acts of Parliament and justified extrajudicial limitations on Parliament. He enunciated a version of judicial
review that required the judiciary to enforce rather than challenge the
acts of a body with sovereign power-his only caveat being the suggestion
that power had to be exercised through such acts. Looking beyond the
judiciary, he recognized that the only effective limitation on Parliament
would have to come from the source of its power. In this regard, he employed the reasoning of contemporary natural-law theory to explain how
abuses of legislative as well as monarchical power could lead to a dissolution of government and a return to the state of nature.
Before examining Holt's ideas-whether concerning extrajudicial
restraints, in Part II, or concerning judicial review, in Part III-this article
must, in Part I, trace the political and constitutional context of Holt's
decision. As will be seen, it was a context rich with possibilities for the
application of modem political theory.
I.

THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Holt's dicta on parliamentary power have long been treated as if they
were just passing observations on political theory, casually or fortuitously
cast up in an opinion concerning the appointment of London's sheriffs.
The political context of Holt's opinion, however, reveals that his dicta
were part of a vigorous debate about limitations on parliamentary power.
The debate was prompted in 1701 when the Tory House of Commons
13. Gough, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Plucknett, supra note 1, at 54, 55).
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imprisoned five petitioners from the county of Kent. In response, Daniel
Defoe and the Whigs condemned not only this'arbitrary imprisonment
but also, more generally, parliamentary assertions of unlimited power.
Drawing upon John Locke and other modern theorists, they expounded
dramatic natural-law ideas about limitations on government, including its
representative institutions. It was toward the close of this debate, after
Defoe and the Whigs had used the modem natural-law theory to censure
the House of Commons, that the ChiefJustice, in the course of his opinion against the City of London, used the theory to admonish Parliament.
A.

The Imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners

The imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners and the debate it provoked came after a century of tumultuous attempts to establish parliamentary limits on monarchical power. During their two seventeenth-century revolutions, large numbers of Englishmen had struggled to cure
England of absolutism-what Locke had called the "French disease"-by
establishing parliamentary and other legal restraints on the Crown.
Although the Revolution of 1688 and '89 (in which Parliament settled the
Crown upon William and Mary) is typically assumed to have established
almost unlimited parliamentary power and, indeed, parliamentary sovereignty, this solution remained controversial. Already at mid-century, during the experiment with parliamentary government, even some erstwhile
supporters of the Parliament (such as the Levellers and, later, William
Prynne) began to worry that the parliamentary cure for monarchical absolutism could be as dangerous as the disease, and in the decades after
14
1688, Englishmen again had opportunities to make this observation.
Although a Parliament responsive to the people might be preferable to
an absolute, hereditary monarch, the danger of an arbitrary exercise of
power was not eliminated simply by subjecting the monarch to
Parliament.
The dispute about the Kentish Petitioners developed amid indications that Parliament, particularly the House of Commons, was increasingly taking advantage of its new-found strength. The Revolution of 1688
had indicated clearly enough the preeminence of Parliament, but the
Tory victory in the election of 1701 led to remarkable attempts to exercise that power. Already in April 1700 it was observed "that the House of
15
Commons had... begun to act 'comme un souveraine'." By early 1701,
Tories in the House of Commons began to formulate plans for an Act of
Settlement that not only would have settled the succession but also would
have seriously limited the power of the Crown. 1 6 Although the more sub14. Foundations of Freedom; Or An Agreement of the People (London 1648);
William M. Lamont, Marginal Prynne 1600-1669, at 175-204 (1963).
15. 6 Poems on Affairs of State 324 n.60 (Frank H. Ellis ed., 1970) (quoting British
Library, Additional Ms. 17677UU, at fol. 203).
16. See Limitations For the Next Foreign Successor, or New Saxon Race 3-23
(London 1701). Among other sources, see comments of Andre Bonnet-the London
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stantial limitations were not included in the bill sent to the Lords in the
middle of May, even the final version of the Act of Settlement revealed
the assertiveness of the Tory House of Commons.
It was in this context that the Commons initiated the most dramatic
post-Revolutionary discussion of parliamentary power by imprisoning five
gentlemen from the county of Kent-an imprisonment that became a
cause cgibre and set the stage for Holt's opinion. As so often, William III
was deeply engaged in his ambitious attempt to halt French advances in
Europe. To his annoyance, however, the largely Tory House of Commons was more concerned about him and the taxes he needed to pay for
his troops than about the French threat. The Commons feared dangers
at home rather than abroad and declined to fund what William and
much of the country perceived as the essential defense of Europe and
Protestantism. Disturbed by the Commons' failure to support the King's
efforts against the French, the Quarter-Sessions for the County of Kent,
meeting at Maidstone, petitioned the Commons "to have Regard to the
Voice of the People," in particular to supply7money so that "Our Religion and
Safety may be Effectually Provided for."'
When the Chairman and four other gentlemen from the sessions attempted to present the petition to the House of Commons, the Tories
who controlled the House responded harshly.' 8 Although the petitioners
reminded the Commons "that it is our Right to Petition this Honorable
House," the latter voted that the petition was "Scandalous, Insolent, and
Seditious" and ordered the Petitioners to be taken into custody. 19 This
imprisonment of gentlemen who had simply exercised their right to petition-and had done so on behalf of Protestantism and resistance to
French aggression-excited "Horror and Amazement."20 The Petitioners
were the focus of widespread sympathy and received prominent visitors in
their places of confinement; as Swift put it, they were "openly carress'd by
resident of the King of Prussia-quoted in 6 Poems on Affairs of State, supra note 15, at
327 n.99.
17. [Daniel Defoe), The History of the Kentish Petition 2 (London 1701) [hereinafter
[Defoe], History]. Note that there were different editions of this pamphlet, and the page
references here are based on the 14-page edition. The petition was recorded among the
papers of the House of Commons in the eighteenth century (Bundle 103, Press 5, in the
Office of Journals and Papers) but presumably was burned in the fire of 1834. See
Schedule of Parliamentary Papers 501 (1733 Ms. shelf list of the Commons' Office of
Journals and Papers, on file with author); for another copy, see British Library, Lansdowne
Ms. 553.
According to Defoe, the petition was signed by all 21 members of the grand jury, then
by the Chairman and 23 of the justices, and then by many freeholders of the county, who
"crouded in so fast, that the Parchment was filled up in less than 5 Hours time." (Defoe],
History, supra, at 1.
18. See id. at 3-4.
19. Id. at 6; see also 13 H.C. Jour. 518 (May 8, 1701).
20. (John Somers], Jura Populi Anglicani: or the Subject's Right of Petitioning Set
Forth 18 (London 1701) [hereinafter [Somers],Jura Populi].
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weeks
the People. 2 1 Yet not until the prorogation of Parliament, seven
22
released.
Petitioners
the
were
began,
after their imprisonment
The Kentish Petition (like the subsequent attack on the House of
Commons) appears to have been largely the work of Daniel Defoe, acting
on behalf of the King. Recognizing the talents and sympathies of the
brilliant, multi-voiced journalist, William III had "Employ'd" and "Rewarded" Defoe, who, not merely on this account, attempted to advance
the cause of the King-the cause of resisting intolerance and foreign aggression.2 3 Accordingly, as part of a scheme to undermine the intransigent Tory House of Commons, which refused to support William's foreign policy, Defoe seems to have orchestrated the drafting and delivery of
the Petition. 2 4 Although Defoe's initial goal was to persuade the Tories
in the House of Commons to abandon their studied inattention to the
21. [Jonathan Swift], A Discourse of the Contests and Dissensions between the Nobles
and the Commons in Athens and Rome 58 (London, John Nutt 1701) [hereinafter [Swift],
Contests and Dissensions].

22. For the visitors, see id. at 10; 2 Bishop Burnet's History of His Own Time 275
(London, Joseph Downing & Henry Woodfall 1734); 6 Poems on Affairs of State, supra

note 15, at 334.
23. See 6 Poems on Affairs of State, supra note 15, at 264, 318. Of course these were
also the policies of many Whigs. William, however, sought to avoid dependence upon
either party. Hence, the usefulness of the Tories, if they could be made pliant. As a result
of Defoe's efforts, the Tories became quite accommodating.
24. Although Defoe attributed authorship of the petition to one of the petitioners,
William Colepeper, Professors Ellis and Bastian attribute it to Defoe. See 6 Poems on
Affairs of State, supra note 15, at 319; Frank Bastian, Defoe's Early Life 250-51 (1981).
Their suggestions are not improbable, for Defoe and Colepeper may already have been
acquainted, and the petition spoke of "the Voice of the People"-a phrase that fits with
Defoe's known writings. See [Defoe], History, supra note 17, at 2. Along similar lines, note
that Colepeper and his fellow Kentishmen delivered their petition to the Commons on the
same day that the King sent the House a Dutch request for troops. See 13 H.C. Jour. 518
(May 18, 1701). Jack Howe, M.P., protested that "the King, the Dutch and the Kentishmen
were all in a plot against the House of Commons." Bastian, supra, at 251. According to
Defoe's history of the petition, William Colepeper "withdrew to Compose it." [Defoe],
History, supra note 17, at 1. According to a Tory, however, Colepeper left the sessions as
part of an elaborate charade: " 'He very gravely retires to Word A Petition that had been sent
down from London in his [sic] Verbis, five Days before the Sessions at Maidstone.'" Bastian,
supra, at 250 (quoting The History of the Kentish Petition Answer'd, Paragraph by
Paragraph 11 (1701)).
In 1701, when discussing the Legion Memmial, Defoe said that it was something "which
I could give a better History of if it were needful." [Daniel Defoe], The Original Power of the
Collective Body of the People of England 24 (London 1702) (date in Narcissus Luttrell's
hand, Dec. 23, [1701], on Folger Library Copy) [hereinafter [Defoe], Original Power]. As
noted by an early biographer, Defoe prudently did not reprint this passage in his collected
works of 1703. See George Chalmers, The Life of Daniel De Foe 14 & n.* (London 1790).
Espousing varied positions, sometimes simultaneously, Defoe was a master of political
disguise. In 1718, an anonymous pamphlet, apparently written by Defoe, concluded by
advising authors "that a Person writing a great deal on various Subjects, should be as
cautious in owning all his Performances, as in revealing the Secrets of his most intimate
Friend." [Daniel Defoe?], A Vindication of the Press 36 (29 Augustan Reprint Soc'y
Publications 1951) (1718).
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French threat, he inadvertently provoked them into demonstrating an
indifference to liberty much closer to home.
B.

The Debate About ParliamentaryPower

Outraged by the arbitrary behavior of the Tory House of Commons,
Defoe and others accused that body in terms that would be reflected in
Holt's analysis. Among other things, they warned the Commons that if
Parliament violated the law of nature or reason, government would be
25
dissolved.
In a hastily printed Memorial purporting to be signed by "Legion,"
Defoe promptly denounced the "Illegal Custody."2 6 According to this
Memorial, the imprisonment of the Petitioners, although without a remedy at law, was contrary to the law of reason and therefore was remediable
by the people:
And tho' there are no stated proceedings to bring you to your
Duty, yet the great Law of Reason says, and all Nations allow,
that whatever Power is above Law, is Burthensome, and Tyrannical; and may be Reduced by ExtrajudicialMethods: You are not
above the Peoples Resentments, they that made you Members,
may reduce you to the same Rank from whence they chose you;
and may give'you a Taste2of
their abused kindness, in Terms you
7
may not be pleas'd with.
In this blunt language that made the claims of "Legion" notorious, Defoe
recognized that Parliament was not limited by "stated proceedings" but,
nonetheless, was subject to "the great Law of Reason," according to which
"whatever Power is above Law, is ... Tyrannical; and may be Reduced by
28
ExtrajudicialMethods."
Recalling the revolutionary events of 1688 and '89, the Memorial asserted that just as the Declaration of Rights had enumerated limitations
25. Defoe's contribution to the debate about the Kentish Petitioners has not received
as much attention as might be expected. For an attempt to reconcile Defoe's statements
about politics in varied publications and contexts, including the dispute about the
Petitioners, see James V. Elliot, The Political and Social Thought of Daniel Defoe: A Study
in the Rise of Liberalism as an Ideology (1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University).
26. [Daniel Defoe], Mr. SR., The Enclosed Memorial 4 & 1 (n.p. [1701])
[hereinafter [Defoe], Memorial].
27. Id. at 1.
28. Contemporaries recognized the radical character of Defoe's analysis. For
example, a Tory wrote:
In the foregoing Paragraph, they set the People above the Parliament,and now
above the Law, investing them with a power to punish by ExtrajudicialMethods, a

trick they have been so long accustom'd to, that they think they can pass it upon
the World under the Title of the Law of Reason, which is a profess'd Enemy to
their Principles, and abhors all power above Law as a violation of common Right,
and a wound given to the very heart ofJustice ....
England's Enemies Exposed 35 (n.p. 1701).
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on the monarch, so, in 1701, the Memorial could list limitations on
Parliament:
When the People of England Assembl'd in Convention,
Presented the Crown to His Present Majesty, they annexed a
Declaration of the Rights of the People, in which was Express'd
what was Illegal and Arbitrary in the former Reign, and was
claim'd as of Right to be done by Succeeding Kings.... In like
manner, here follows .. . a short abridgement of the Nations
Grievances, and of your Illegal and Unwarrantable Practices;
and a Claim of Right which we make in the Name of our

Selves ....

29

In its list of the Commons' "Illegal and Unwarrantable Practices," the
Memorial asserted that "[t]o imprison Men who are not your own Members, by no Proceedings but a Vote of the House ... is Illegal .... ,,30 In
its Declaration of Rights, it made the corresponding claim: "That the
House of Commons have no Legal power to imprison any Person, or commit them to Custody of Serjants, or otherwise (their own Members except[ed]) .... -al This limitation on the "Legal Power" of the Commons
was, as already noted, without a remedy by "stated proceedings," but it
did have an "extrajudicial" remedy:
That if the House of Commons, in Breach of the Laws and Liberties of the People, do betray the Trust repos'd in them, and act
Negligent[ly] or Arbitrarily and Illegally, it is the undoubted
Right of the People of England to call them to an Account for
the same, and by Convention, Assembly or Force may proceed
32
against them as Traitors and Betraiers of their Country.
The Memorial concluded:
Thus Gentlemen. You have your Duty laid before you ....
but if
you continue to neglect it, you may expect to be treated according to the Resentment of an injur'dNation;for Englishmen
are no
33
more to be Slaves to Parliament, than to a King.
34
To this, Defoe subscribed, "Our Name is Legion, and we are Many."
Not merely the King but even Parliament was accountable to the people,
if not by the ballot, then "by Convention, Assembly or Force."
29.
30.
31.
32.

[Defoe], Memorial, supra note 26, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4. Compare John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 366-67, 412

(II.xiii.149, II.xix.221) (Peter Laslett ed., 1963) [hereinafter Locke, Two Treatises].

33. [Defoe], Memorial, supra note 26, at 6.
34. Id. at 4. Defoe borrowed this line from Milton's Animadversions upon the

Remonstrants Defence, Against Smectymnuus (London 1641). See Paula R Backscheider,
Daniel Defoe His Life 82 (1989).
In a curious twist of events, Defoe and Colepeper soon found themselves exchanging
roles, for in 1703, when Defoe was imprisoned for writing his famous parody of religious
intolerance, The Shortest Way with Dissenters, Colepeper provided legal counsel and

eloquently petitioned the Privy Council for Defoe's release. Soon, however, it was
Colepeper who was in trouble again. While waiting to deliver his petition on behalf of
Defoe to the Privy Council, Colepeper tactlessly conversed about the fact that Admiral
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A more temperate attack on the Commons came from the great
Whig lawyer, John Somers-a friend of John Locke's and recently Lord
Chancellor-who argued that the Commons had violated the people's
right of petitioning. Drawing on Locke's theory that people entered civil
society to preserve their rights or "property," and that a person's property
could not be taken without his consent, Somers explained that petitioning was a right the people could not have relinquished. 35 Alas, he made
this interesting point in the prose of one who excelled in his profession:
'Tis certain that nothing can be more agreeable to Nature,
and a plainer Dictate of Reason, than that those who apprehend
themselves aggreiv'd be allow'd a liberty to approach those by
Petition who know their Grievances, or perhaps are the Authors
of them, and consequently able to redress them. When Men
enter'd first into Society, and gave up that Right which they had
to secure themselves in the State of Nature, 'tis manifest that
they did it for the preservation of Property, which is the end of
Government. This necessarily supposes, and indeed requires,
that People should have Property, without which they must be
suppos'd to lose that by ent[e]ring into Society, which was the
end for which they enter'd into it. If men enter'd into Society to
preserve it, and therefore are so entitled to it, that (as a very
Learned and Ingenious Author [John Locke] tells us*) The
supreme Power cannot takefrom any man any part of his Property without his own consent; Can any Absurdity be so gross, as to imagine,
that men gave up their Right to pray for Redress, if they thought
themselves injur'd in their Properties? Or that the supreme
Power may hinder them to pray for that which they have not a
right to deprive them of? Wherever therefore any Government
is established, there the natural Right which People had to secure what was their own, must be so far at least continued, as to
allow them a liberty to petition for what they think their Right,
because this is a Privilege3 6which they could not give up, when
they enter'd into Society.
From Locke's ideas about the preservation of property, Somers concluded that the "natural Right" of the people "to secure what was their
own" had to "be so far at least continued, as to allow them a liberty to
petition for what they think their Right." This was a freedom "they could
Rooke (a fellow Kentishman and a political opponent) was at Bath rather than in more
dangerous waters. For this, Colepeper became the object of an attempted assassination,
resulting in a trial before ChiefJustice Holt. Of course, the whole affair was written up by
Defoe. See William Chadwick, The Life and Times of Daniel De Foe 186-96 (London,
John Russell Smith 1859).
35. Locke wrote that men united in society "for the mutual Preservation of their Lives,
Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property." Locke, Two Treatises,
supra note 32, at 395 (IMix.123).

36. [Somers],Jura Populi, supra note 20, at 30-31. According to Somers's footnote
(marked by the asterisk), the person who said that property could only be taken with
consent was the "The Author of two Treatises of Government." Id. at 30 n.*; see also J.W.
Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy 184 (1973).
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not give up, when they enter'd into Society"
and thus could not have
7
submitted to the discretion of Parliament.3
In enunciating limitations on the power of Parliament, both Somers
and Defoe drew attention to the power of the people. 38 After quoting
the Whig martyr, Algernon Sydney, on the accountability of members of
Parliament to their electors, Somers justified petitioning by arguing that
"the Freemen of England" had not "delegated their whole Power" to their

37. Among the other critics of the Commons was Jonathan Swift. In a dispassionate
tone suggestive of his disdain for party politics, Swift compared the House of Commons to
popular bodies in ancient times and drew attention to the danger of a representative body
inadequately restrained by a balance of power. Although he focused on the question of
impeachments, he also addressed himself to the more general problem of the power of the
Commons.
From his historical examples, Swift concluded that it was an "Error" to assert "that
Power is safer lodged in many Hands than in one.... [Tihey are as capable of Enslaving
the Nation, and of acting all Manner of Tyranny and Oppression as it is possible for a
single Person to be." [Swift], Contests and Dissensions, supra note 21, at 10. Swift even
suggested that there was a need "of fixing the due Limits of Powerand Privilege" Id. at 12.
Like Defoe, he hinted at a written limitation on the power of the House of Commons:
It were to be wish'd, that the most August Assembly of the Commons would
please to form a Pandectof their own Power and Privileges, to be confirmed by the
entire Legislative Authority, and that in as solemn a manner (if they please) as the
Magna Charta. But to fix one Foot of their Compass wherever they think fit, and
extend the other to such terrible Lengths, without describing any Circumference
at all, is to leave us and themselves in a very uncertain State.
Id. at 52. Without a written Magna Charta limiting the Commons, their power would be
uncircumscribed.
Swift also wrote that there was an "unlimited Power placed fundamentally in the Body
of a People." Id. at 3. This power "is what the Legislators of all Ages have endeavour'd...
to deposite in such Hands as would preserve the People." Id. at 3-4. Yet most such
legislators "seem to agree in this, that it was a Trust too great to be committed to any one
Man or Assembly, and therefore they left the Right still in the whole Body." Id. at 4. Of
course, this statement was not as radical as it may sound, for it appeared in the context of
Swift's discussion of a balance of power. Swift very carefully did not go so far as to say that
a breach of trustjustified revolution, and he explained that his argument was compatible
with either the contractual or the familial model of government. Id. at 4.
38. Defoe claimed that "[w]e have for some time past observ'd, that it has been
possible even for so great an Assembly to Err," although whether he was referring to the
Levellers or, perhaps, William Prynne or anyone in particular is by no means clear. [Daniel
Defoe], Legion's Second Memorial, quoted in Legion's Second Memorial To the Late
House of Commons, Answer'd Paragraph by Paragraph 32 (London 1702) [hereinafter
Legion's Second Memorial Answer'd]. Of course, Defoe's position differed from that of
his predecessors in various ways.
Incidentally, on the assumption that sovereignty was indivisible and that justice was
not possible where "every particular man may be Judge in his own case," Edmund Bohun
had argued that, "no man can assure himself of moreJustice from a Senate, or a Multitude,
than from a Prince, or single Person." [Edmund Bohun], A Defence of Sir Robert Filmer,
Against the Mistakes and Misrepresentations of Algernon Sidney, Esq. 8-9 (London 1684).

2104

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:2091

representatives. 3 9 More generally, Somers noted that the power retained
by the people included a right of self-preservation:
The Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, sent by the People of
England to serve in Parliament, have a Trust reposed in them,
which if they should manifestly betray, the People, in whom the
Power is more perfectly and fully than in their40Delegates, must
have a Right to help and preserve themselves.
Not burdened with Somers's sense of restraint, Defoe broke into verse on
the necessity of limiting parliamentary as well as monarchical power and
thereby hinted at a rather forceful remedy:
Nature [h]as left this Tincture in the Blood,
That all Men wou'd be Tyrants if they cou'd.
Not Kings alone, not Ecclesiastick pride,
But Parliaments,and all Mankind beside ....
Posterity will be asham'd to own
The Actions we their Ancestors have done, ...
To see one Tyrant banish'd from his Home,
41
To set Five Hundred Traytors in his Room
As if to leave no doubt that he had greater concern for liberty than literature, Defoe suggested the means of restraining the "Five Hundred
Traytors" in a not-quite poetic address to the Commons:
It was our Freedom to defend,
That We the People chose you,
And We the People do pretend
Our power of Choosing may extend
42
To punish and depose you.
Whereas in the seventeenth century the Crown was often said to be responsible to Parliament and only indirectly to the people, Defoe and the
Whigs, in their attempt to find limitations on Parliament, now empha39. [Somers],Jura Populi, supra note 20, at 51. A more Complete quotation is: "They
who tell us that the Representatives of the Freemen of England ... are to act without

controul, cannot sure mean that they have delegated their whole power to them .... " Id.
40. Id. at 51.
41. [Defoe], History, supra note 17, at [14] (Addenda). Also:
They'l be amazed to see there was but Five,
Whose Courage could their Liberty survive,
While we that durst Illegal Power dethrone,
Should basely be Enslav['] d by Tyrants of our own.
Id.
42. [Daniel Defoe], A New Satyr on the Parliament (1701), reprinted in 6 Poems on
Affairs of State, supra note 15, at 330. He also wrote:
Did we for this depose our Prince,
And Liberty assume,
That you should with our Laws dispense,
Commit Mankind without Offence,
And Govern in his Room?
Id. at 327.
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sized direct accountability to the people. 43 Among -the precedents for
this accountability was Locke's "Doctrineof a Power in the People of providing for their safety a-new by a new Legislative, when their Legislators
have acted contrary to their trust." a4 Although developed in response to
monarchical power, Locke's ideas were significant for the criticism of the
Tory House of Commons-as they would be later for Holt's opinion
about parliamentary power in City of London v. Wood.
By means of a pamphlet, The OriginalPower of the Collective Body of the
People of England, Defoe elaborated his position that the people of
England retained some power. "There must," he reasoned, "be some
Power Priorto the Power of King, Lords and Commons," and this power
lay in the "People of England."45 They "were a People before there was
such a thing as a Constitution," and from this it was apparent that "the
People were the only Original" of the power of government. 46 "[F] rom the
mutual Consent of these people [,] the Powers and Authorities of this Constitution are derived."47 The people, moreover, retained some power to
replace their constitution and government:
There must always remain a Supream Power in the Original
to supply, in Case of the Dissolution of Delegated Power.
The People of England have delegated all the Executive
Power in the King, the Legislative in the King, Lords and Commons, the Soveraign Judicature in the Lords, the Remainder is
43. For another example, note that Defoe's Second Memorial told the Commons that
they had "forgot that the Original of all Right is derived from, and vested in the People."
[Daniel Defoe], Legion's Second Memorial, quoted in Legion's Second Memorial
Answer'd, supra note 38, at 23. Similarly, it said that "the Freeholders of England are your
Superiors." Id. at 10. To this, an anonymous pamphleteer responded: "If the Freeholders
of England (viz. their Electors) are their Representatives Superiors; it may as well be said,
that the Gentlemen of the Convention that made Choice of his Present Majesty, and the
following Parliament that Recogniz'd the Lawfulness of his Title, are Superior to his
Majesty, which is Arrogant as well as Absurd." Id. Quoting one of his own poems, Defoe
said of monarchical power.
That Kings when they descend to Tyranny,
Dissolve the Bond, and leave the Subject free.
Then he added in prose: "If the People are justifiable in this Procedure against the King,
I hope I shall not be Censur'd if I say, That if any one should ask me, whether they have not the
same Right, in the same Cases, against any of the Three Heads of the Constitution, I dare not
answer in the Negative." [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 6. In his history of this
period, a contemporary, Alexander Cunningham, wrote that the critics of the Commons
"proceeded even so far as to affirm that the house of commons might be controlled by the
people, whose representatives they are." 1 Alexander Cunningham, The History of Great
Britain from the Revolution in 1688 to the Accession of George the First 208 (London,
Thomas Hollingbery 1787).
44. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 464 (II.xix.226). Of course, Locke
defined the legislative in a way that included the king, Lords, and Commons in their
legislative capacities.
45. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 8.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id.
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reserv'd in themselves, and not committed, no not to their Representatives ....

48

Of the representatives or Members of Parliament, Defoe added that
"[wihat Power they have they receive from the People they represent; and, That
some Powers do stillremain with the People, which they never neitherdivested themselves of nor committed to them." 49 On these grounds, "when Parliaments
...
betray the People they Represent, the People themselves, who are the
Original of all Delegated Power, have an undoubted Right to defend
their Lives, Liberties, Properties, Religion and Laws"-"the Constitution
is dissolv'd," and, in accord with "the Laws of Nature and Reason," the
people have a right to defend themselves and create a new constitution.50
In prose rich with cadences and metaphors almost poetic, Defoe brought
his essay to a conclusion by contrasting the mortality of representative
government to the eternity of the people:
The House of Commons... are Mortal, as a House; a King
may Dissolve them, they may die and be extinct; but the Power
of the People has a kind of Eternity with Respect to Politick Duration: Parliaments may cease, but the People remain; for them
they were originally made, by them they are continued and renewed, from them they receive their Power, and to them in reason they ought to be accountable. 51
Rarely in verse did Defoe reach such heights as when he wrote that the
House of Commons could "die and be extinct; but the Power of the
People has a kind of Eternity."
Apparently after reading Defoe's pamphlet, the noted Deist, John
Toland, similarly waxed lyrical about the people and their relation to
their representatives:
Ever since I knew what it was to be a Member of civil Society, or
to concern my self about the Nature of Government, I have bin
wholly devoted to the self-evident Principle of Liberty, and a
profest Enemy to Slavery and arbitraryPower. I have always bin,
now am, and ever shall be persuaded that all Sorts of Magistrats
are made for and by the People, and not the People for or by
the Magistrats: that the Power of all Governors is originally conferr'd by the Society, and limited to their Safety, Wealth, and
Glory, which makes those Governors accountable for their
Trust: and consequently that it is lawful to resist and punish Ty48. Id. Compare this and the other passages quoted in the text to Locke, Two
Treatises, supra note 32, at 413 (II. xiii.149).
49. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 14.
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id. at 23; see also id. (The Dedication to the Lords and Commons.) For Locke's
discussion of the perpetual power of the community and of the "Power of the People," see
Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 413 (II.xiii.149). Circa 1697, in the margin of his
copy of Tyrrell's Patriarchanon Monarcha,one Francis Gibbon commented "tis the power of
ye people w[hi]ch is perpetualI; for king~s] sometimes dye without heirs, or abdicate, & then
the people must Settle the Government." James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha 257
(sig. Si) (London 1681) (Folger Library copy) (abbreviation marks omitted).
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rants of all Kinds, be it a single Person or greater Number of
Men; for the Case was just alike to the People of Denmark (for
Example) whether their House of Commons had assum'd an unor conferr'd such a Power (as
limitted Authority to themselves,
52
they did) on their King.
Not merely kings but "all Sorts of Magistrats," including the House of
Commons, were "made for and by the People" and were "accountable for
their Trust."
Of course, Tories responded to Defoe and Somers rather differently
than did Toland: Tories claimed that Whigs wanted to subject
Parliament to the mob. Members of Parliament were said to have "sat in
fear of their Persons from popular Rage."53 According to one Tory, the
"Legion" were "threatening" the Commons "with bringing down the Mob
upon them" and "were forming a Rebellion." 54 Later, a "Mr. Whiglove"
was represented as telling a "Mr. Double"-a duplicitous Whig-that "a
52. John Toland, Vindicius Liberius: Or, M. Toland's Defence of Himself 125-26
(London 1702). Toland was an acquaintance of Locke and Tyrrell and the editor of
Harrington, Ludlow, Milton and Sidney. Upon returning from a diplomatic mission to
Hanover and Berlin, the undiplomatic Toland eagerly read the pamphlets he had missed
while abroad, including attacks upon his deism and probably Defoe's OriginalPower. See
id. at 1. In response to the religious criticism, he professed in print to be an Anglican and
added to this the rather more resolute political testament printed above. Although proud
of his knowledge of ten languages, Toland's spelling suggests that his return from
Germany occurred none too soon.
Toland is frequently treated by modern scholars as a "republican," yet this passage,
among others, suggests that his republicanism was hardly incompatible with modern
natural-law ideas. Cf. Houston, supra note 8, at 3-8, passim; Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit
of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the
Philosophy of Locke (1988).
53. [Swift], Contests and Dissensions, supra note 21, at 58. In the fall of 1701, Lord
Sunderland advised William III to rely upon the Whigs, asking the King:
Can he forget how the Tories agreed to the ten thousand men, and the address to
enter into alliances with the emperor? Was it not because it would have been
done without them, and that they were frighted out of their wits, and to oblige
him to thank them at last, that they might go into the country with safety?
Letter from Lord Sunderland to William III (Sept. 11, 1701), in 2 Miscellaneous State
Papers from 1501 to 1726, at 445 (Philip Yorke ed., London 1778). Defoe flattered himself
that his Legion Memorial "frighted" various Tories "into the Country," and Tories were all
too happy to attribute extreme measures to their opponents, as observed in the text here.
6 Poems on Affairs of State, supra note 15, at 328-29 n.135. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that these claims were at least as convenient as sincere. As Frank H. Ellis has pointed
out, "[t] he diplomatic correspondents... reported that it was the Kentish petition that had
caused the fears." Id.
54. England's Enemies Exposed, supra note 28, at 31. A Tory poet wrote:
While fearful of Invasions from a far,
At home they meditate a Civil War,
And hatch Rebellion underneath a Zeal,
To save, and to promote the Common-Weal,
As they for Mutinies most humbly sue,
And would revive the Crimes of Forty Two.
The Kentish Men. A Satyr 2 (London 1701) [hereinafter Kentish Men].
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competent Number of the People were ripe for any Mischief, and you
had got a good Share of the Mob of your Side, even against a House of
Commons, which hardly ever happen'd before in England."55 Addressing
Lord Somers-the most prominent Whig defender of the Petitioners-a
Tory poet said of Englishmen with "Estates or sense" that:
They well foresee your ruin and confusion,
Who thus expos'd our boasted Constitution;
Strove to subvert all Pow'r, and Rights, and Laws;
For your wild Maxims ruin every Cause.
If the Trustees of all Mankind be5 false,
6
Welcome Hobbs's state of Nature!
From the Whigs could be expected Hobbesian anarchy.
In response to these accusations that the Whigs were inviting mob
rule, Defoe transformed the criticism implied by the word "mob" into a
justification. He told the Commons that they were "[t]he abstract of our
Mobb."5 7 Although he explained at length that "[w]hen... I am speaking of the Right of the People, I would be understood of the Freeholders," he appears to have added this to reassure freeholders rather than
the Commons. 5 8 Certainly, his qualification seemed rather weak following, as it did, his discussion of the right of the people or "mob":
[W]hen Parliaments .... should ... betray the People they
Represent, the People themselves, who are the Original of all
Delegated Power, have an undoubted Right to defend their
55. [Charles Davenant], The True Picture of a Modem Whig, Set forth in a Dialogue
Between Mr. Whiglove & Mr. Double 8 (London 1701). Swift wrote that the Whigs "have
been Authors of a new and wonderful Thing in England,which is, for a House of Commons
to lose the universal Favour of the Numbers they represent ....
[T]hose whom they
thought fit to persecute for Righteousness sake, have been openly caress'd by the People."
[Swift], Contests and Dissensions, supra note 21, at 58. An anonymous Tory pamphleteer
wrote that the supporters of the Petitioners were "favoured with the good Opinion of the
Gaderene Mob." The Legionites Plot: Or an Account of Some Late Designs to Create a
Misunderstanding Betwixt the King and His People 8 (London 1702).
56. The Triumph of the Great L[or]d S[omers] 11 (London 1701). Incidentally,
compare Dryden's account of the possibility that:
...government itself at length must fall
To nature's state, where all have right to all.
John Dryden, Absalom and Achitophel, in English Poetry of the Restoration and Early
Eighteenth Century 90, 115 11.793-94 (H.T. Swedenberg,Jr. ed., 1968). He complained of
a situation in which
the crowd be judge of fit and just,
And kings are only officers in trust.
Id. at 114 11.765-66.
Add that the pow'r, for property allow'd,
Is mischievously seated in the crowd;
For who can be secure of private right,
If sovereign sway may be dissolv'd by might?
Id. at 114 11.777-80.
57. [Daniel Defoe], Legion's New Paper 4 (London 1702); Daniel Defoe, A New Satyr
on the Parliament (1701), in 6 Poems on Affairs of State, supra note 15, at 318, 325.
58. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 19.
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Lives, Liberties, Properties, Religion and Laws.... the Constitution is dissolv'd, and the Laws of Nature and Reason act of
Course according to the following System of Government.
The Government's ungirt when Justice dies,
And Constitutions are non Entities:
The Nation's all a Mob; there's no such thing
As Lords and Commons, Parliament or King.
A great promiscuous Croud the Hydra lies,
Till Laws revive, and mutual Contract ties.
A Chaos free to chuse for their own Share,

What Case of Government they please to wear. 59

He added that upon "a general Dissolution of Government," the people,
"assembled in a Universal Mob to take the Right of Government upon
themselves," could act through a "Convention"-an obvious reference to
the events of 1688 and '89.60
The danger that required popular restraints even on the House of
Commons and Parliament was not merely the risk of arbitrary imprisonment but, more generally, the undefined extent of parliamentary power.
As one writer-possibly Lord Somers-noted shortly before the imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners, "'Tis hard to say what Parliaments
cannot do: The Boundaries of their Power not being fix'd, 'tis difficult to
determine when 'tis carry'd beyond the utmost extent of its Tether." 61
Similarly, Defoe told Members of Parliament that "possibly the Extent ofyour
Legal Authority was neverfully understood, nor have you ever thoughtfit to Ex59. Id. at 16; cf. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 459-60 (II.xix.219-20). The
words "according to the following System of Government" are taken from a 1703 revision
by Defoe in which these words were substituted for the 1702 edition's phrase: "according
to the late Author, quoted before." Daniel Defoe, The Original Power of the Collective
Body of the People of England, in A True Collection of the Writings of the Author of the
True-Born Englishman 133, 155 (London 1703) [hereinafter [Defoe], True Collection]. I
have followed the revised text in this respect simply to avoid a phrase that is rather
awkward-as Defoe himself appears to have recognized.
The verse is quoted from his True-Born Englishman of early 1701 and is but one
indication that in the Kentish Petition debate Defoe was applying ideas he had already
espoused in other controversies.
60. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 17. Elsewhere, in response to a ballad
by Defoe, an anonymous author (perhaps Defoe himself) purported to give the Commons'
justification of their treatment of the Petitioners:
And since such falsehoods were giv'n out,
by those who wish'd 'em Evil,
Twas time for them to look about,
And to prevent the Rabble Rout;
Since Mob's a very Devil.
[Daniel Defoe?], The Ballad, or: Some Scurrilous Reflections in Verse 19 (London, D.
Edwards [1701]) (response to stanza 27).
61. [John Somers],Jus Regium: Or, the King's Right to Grant Forfeitures 44 (London
1701). He continued, however: "But that there is a Tether to their Power is most certain,
since besides divine Revelation, the Law of Nature or Reason tells us, that there are rules
and measures of Right and Wrong which no positive Law of Man can exceed." Id.
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plain it." 6 2 This uncertainty was hardly made less worrisome when Tories

pronounced that the King, Lords, and Commons, when acting together,
"have an Absolute Supreme Power,to do whatever they shall think necessary
or convenient for the Publick Good, of which they are the only Judges, there
being no Legal Power on Earth to Controul them."63 In response, Whigs
attributed to Tories the opinion "that as soon as ever the Members were
chosen, they were then left to the absolute Freedom of their own Wills, to
act without Controul; and though they are abusively called the People's
64
Servants, yet really and in truth, they.., become their Masters."
Of particular concern to Defoe was the suggestion that Parliament
and even merely the Commons could authorize someone to do whatever
he pleased, without restraint by law. In his History of the Kentish Petition,
Defoe recounted with relish the claims supposedly made by the
Commons' Serjeant to the Petitioners:
On Friday in the Evening, Mr. Sergeant began to treat with them
and representing his absolute Power, letting them know, That he
had an Unbounded liberty of using them at Discretion, that [he] could
confine them at pleasure, put them in Dungeons, lay them under
Ground, keep them apart, remove them65daily[,] and keep all peoplefrom
them, by making them close Prisoners.
Later, Defoe warned that "[t]he Commons may extend their Power to an
exorbitant Degree, in Imprisoning the Subjects" and in "giving unlimited
Power to their Sergeant to Oppress the People in his Custody. '66 The
possibility that Parliament might give someone "an Unbounded liberty"
of "using" other persons "at Discretion" was a danger to which Holt would
soon address himself.
For purposes of understanding Holt's opinion in City of London v.
Wood, an important feature of the debate about the Kentish Petitioners is
the seeming paradox created by Defoe and others who complained both
that the House of Commons had unlimited power and that it had acted
unlawfully. For example, in a Second Memorial to the Commons, Defoe
said that "[c]ommitting to Custody those Gentlemen... is Illegal and
Injurious; Destructive of the Subjects Liberty of Petitioning for Redress of
Grievances." 67 Yet shortly after denouncing the imprisonment of the
62. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, Dedication. He continued:

"But this I

may be bold to advance, That whatever Powersyou have, or may have, you cannot Exercise but in the
Name of the Commons of England, and you enjoy them as theirRepresentative, andfor their Use."
Id.
63. [Humphrey Mackworth], A Vindication of the Rights of the Commons of England
3 (London, J. Nutt 1701) [hereinafter [Mackworth], Vindication] (date in Narcissus
Luttrell's hand, Aug. 22, on Folger Library copy).

64. The Electors Right Asserted with the Advices and Charges of Several Counties,
Cities and Boroughs in England to Their Respective Members of Parliament Who are to

Meet at Westminister on the 30th of December, 1701, at I (London 1701).
65. [Defoe], History, supra note 17, at 7.
66. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 4.
67. [Daniel Defoe], Legion's Second Memorial, quoted in Legion's Second Memorial
Answer'd, supra note 38, at 9-10.
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Petitioners as "Illegal," he also observed that the power of the Commons
was unlimited: "You are the Men, who... having the Liberties and Estates of your native Country put into your Hands, mis-improv'd that unlimited Power, to oppress the very People who chose you to defend
them."68 This apparent contradiction did not go unnoticed by Tories,
one of whom responded by arguing that "if [the Commons'] Power was
could they act conunlimited, that is, uncircumscrib'd by any Law, how
69
trary to Magna Charta, which is the Law of Lavs?"
Yet, in arguing that parliamentary power was unlimited and that
Parliament or, at least, the Commons had acted unlawfully, Defoe and
the Whigs were not necessarily being inconsistent. Defoe's first Memorial
had argued that Parliament had violated the "law of reason" or "of na70
ture" and that therefore an "extrajudicial" remedy lay with the people.
His Second Memorial similarly took the position that the Commons' exercise of power was unlawful, even if it was not remediable at law, because it
was a contradiction: "Voting a Petition from the Gentlemen of Kent Insolent... is a Contradiction in it self, and a Contempt of the English Freedom, and contrary to the Nature of Parliamentary Power."71 As Holt later
the
argued in City of London v. Wood on the basis of the law of nature,
72
action was unlawful because it was "a Contradiction in it self."
C. ParliamentaryUsurpationof the Role of the Courts
The Commons' imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners could be
viewed not only as a contradiction and a violation of natural law but also,
more specifically, as one of several attempts by the Commons to usurp
the judicial role of the courts.
Somers argued vigorously that by punishing individuals who had not
violated any law, and by assuming the role of judge, the House of
Commons was treating the people of England as slaves. "[T]hey who assume a Power to punish a People who live under the direction of the
Laws, without a Rule or Law, destroy the Rights and Liberties of the Peo68. Id. at 16.
69. Id. at 17. This Tory also argued that "[i]f they [the Petitioners] have been
wrongfully us'd, the Law has been open to 'em, and the Judges would have determin'd in

their Favour in the Cause between the Serjeant and them, which they have not thought fit
to do as yet." Id. at 9.
70. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 27 & 50. As so often, he took more than
one position. He purported to make fun of "Book learn'd Fools" such as himself by
rhyming that
Knowledg[e] of things would teach them every Hour,
That Law is but an Heathen Word for Power.
[Defoe], History, supra note 17, at [14] (Addenda).
71. [Daniel Defoe], Legion's Second Memorial, quoted in Legion's Second Memorial
Answer'd, supra note 38, at 10.
72. Defoe also wrote that "[the Vindication of the Original Right of all Men to the
Government of themselves, is so farfrom a Derogationfrom, that it is a Confirmation of your legal
Authority." [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, Dedication.
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pie, take away their Freedom, and reduce them to a perfect State of Slavery."73 Later, with a rhetorical flourish, he asked:
Tyrannick Slavery did I say? Some may call it so, when in a Free
State, where the whole Legislative only has a Power to set down
what Punishment shall be inflicted on the several Transgressions
that are committed, a Part of it assumes a Power to inflict one of
the severest Punishments ....74
The Commons did not have the power by themselves to enact a penalty,
yet they had assumed the power to inflict one. Even if petitioning were
illegal, the Commons did not have the power to judge and punish it:
From what I have here delivered concerning the Power of
imprisoning in the Lower House, 'tis evident, I think, that if Petitioning, as the Kentish Gentlemen did, had been an illegal Act,
and the Punishment enjoin'd by the Law, had been Imprisonment, yet it belonged not to them to inflict that Punishment,
done heretofore)
but to make application (as they have always
75
to have the Law executed against them.
The House of Commons could participate in making law but could not
execute it.
Defoe also argued that in acting against the Petitioners, the
Commons should have limited itself to regular legal proceedings. The
Commons "ought to Address the King, to cause any Person, on good
Grounds, to be apprehended, which Person so apprehended, ought to
have the Benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act, and be fairly brought to Tryal
by due Course of Law." 76 According to Defoe, "if any Expression be offensive to the House .... they are at Liberty to proceed as the Law directs;
but no otherwise." 77 Defoe even referred to the "Interruption of Com73. [Somers],Jura Populi, supra note 20, at 25.
74. Id. at 29. He continued:
When a few who are chosen to be Trustees and Guardians of the People's
Liberties, bring the People under their absolute Power, and compel them to that
which is against the Right of their Freedom. To be free from such Force is the
only Security men have of their Preservation, and Reason bids them to look on
those as Enemies to their Preservation, who would take away that Freedom which
is the Fence to it; and so conclude that they have a Will and Design to take away
every thing else, since that Freedom is the Foundation of all the rest.
Id. at 29-30. Another Whig wrote: "[T] here's nothing more to be dreaded, than a popular
Assembly taking upon itself an Executive as well as a Legislative Power, by punishing whom
they please, and for what they please." A Short Defence of the Last Parliament, Answer'd
Article by Article to Which is Added a Paper, Called the Candidates Try'd 21 (London
1702).
75. Id. at 30.
76. [Defoe], Memorial, supra note 26, at 4.
77. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 5. He also wrote: "The Commons may
extend their Power to an exorbitant Degree, in Imprisoning the Subjects, Dispensing with
the Habeas Corpus Act, giving unlimited Power to their Sergeant to Oppress the People in
his Custody, witholding Writs of Election from Burroughs and Towns, and several other
ways .... " Id. at 4. A Tory responded to such arguments against the Commons by saying
that "[i]f they are capable ofjudging what Laws are fit to punish Criminals, I hope they are
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mon Justice" as a basis for considering the government to be dissolved
and power to be in the hands of the people. 78 Indeed, unlike Locke, who
suggested that only a substantial breach of trustjustified revolution, 79 Defoe insisted that:
[T] he first Invasion made upon Justice either by the tacit or actual Assent of the three Heads of our Constitution, is an actual
Dissolution of the Constitution; and, for ought I can see, the
People have a Right to dispossess the Incumbent, and80 commit
the Trust of Government, de novo, upon that first Act.

Thus, the "first Invasion made upon Justice" could have extraordinary
consequences.
Defoe's suggestion that the Commons could bring a complaint but
could not substitute their proceedings for a "Tryal by due Course of Law"
was echoed when the Lords rejected an attempt by the Commons to interfere in the trial of impeachments. As the debate about the imprisonment of the Petitioners began, the Tory House of Commons was asserting
itself by impeaching some of the King's recent ministers, including Lord
Somers. After voting these impeachments, the Commons attempted to
dictate the dates and voting procedures for the trials. The House of
Lords, however, refused to consult with the Commons about the dates
and procedures, particularly for the trial of Somers, and thereby a dispute
developed, as a result of which the Commons declined to proceed against
him. When the Lords promptly acquitted Somers, the lower house accused the Lords of having "refused Justice to the Commons... by denying them a Committee of both Houses, which was desired .

.

. as the

81
proper and only Method of settling the necessary Preliminaries." The
Commons even protested that the "Proceedings of the Lords" were "repugnant to the Rules of Justice; and therefore null and void."8 2 The
Lords viewed this position as an infringement of their right to conduct
trials of impeachments and therefore answered that the resolutions of the
Commons "do manifestly tend to the Destruction of the Judicature of the
Lords."83 In defense of the Commons, a prominent Tory Member of
capable of knowing when a Person has broken such Laws." The Legionites Plot: Or an

Account of Some Late Designs To Create a Misunderstanding Betwixt the King and his
People 13 (London 1702).
78. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 12.
79. See Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 463-64 (II.xix.225).
80. [Defoe], Original Power, supra note 24, at 12. Incidentally, this was not a new
doctrine for Defoe. In his True-Born Englishman, he wrote:
When Kings the Sword ofJustice first lay down,
They are no Kings, though they possess the Crown.
[Daniel Defoe], The True-Born Englishman, in [Defoe], True Collection, supra note 59, at
25.
81. 13 H.C. Jour. 639 (June 20, 1701).
82. Id.
83. 16 H.L. Jour. 766 (June 23, 1701). Earlier, the Lords had accused the Commons
of "a direct Invading of their Judicature." 13 H.C. Jour. 637 (June 20, 1701). A Whig
wrote: "And therefore for the Lords to take in a Committee of the Commons ... was to let
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Parliament, Sir Humphrey Mackworth argued that "[t] he Right ofJudicature in the Lords must not be extended so far, as to enable the Lords to
make the Right of Impeachments in the Commons Impracticable."" 4 In
response, an anonymous writer, perhaps Lord Somers, pointed out that
whereas the Commons were the complainants and could impeach, the
Lords had the "Decisive Power" and this "cannot be in the Complainants,
for that would make them Judges in their own Cause."8 5 In addition,
Jonathan Swift criticized the House of Commons forjustifying itself with a
declaration of its rights: "To pretend to a declarative Right upon any
occasion whatsoever, is little less than to make use of the whole Power:
That is, to declare an opinion to be Law."8 6 When interfering with the
judicial role of the Lords, the Commons came close to usurping the legislative power of Parliament as a whole.
Thus, in imprisoning the Kentish Petitioners and impeaching Lord
Somers, the House of Commons revealed the danger of unlimited representative government, and it did so in a way that led Defoe, Somers, and
many of their contemporaries to fear that the House was claiming something like judicial power-typically in disputes to which it was a party.
The House of Commons even prompted some commentators to worry
that in support of its claims ofjudicial authority, it was expanding its legislative power. Among those who shared these fears was ChiefJustice Holt.
D.

The Denouement in the House of Commons and the Participationof
John Locke

Toward its conclusion, the dispute about parliamentary power
shifted from the pages of pamphlets back to the floor of the House of
Commons, where the controversy had begun with the imprisonment of
the Kentish Petitioners. Having suffered in the press at the hands of Defoe and others who accused them of abusing their power, the Tories attempted to prevail in the arena they controlled.
the Commons participate of their Judicature." A Letter from Some Electors to One of
their Representatives in Parliament 17 (London 1701).

84. [Mackworth], Vindication, supra note 63, at 18. With respect to the powers of the
Commons and the Lords in connection with impeachments, he also said that "both the
Powers must admit of such a Limitation and Construction in the Nature and Exercise
thereof, as that they may consist together for the Common Good." Id. at 18. "[]tmustbe
acknowledged, that a right of Judicature, does necessarily imply a power of Judging and
Determining,whether an Offender that is brought to Tryal for any Offence, be Guilty or not

Guilty, for that is inseperably annexed thereunto.... But the appointinga time for bringing
in the Articles of Impeachment, and of Time andPlacefor Tryal, is not necessarily implyed in
the power ofJudicature, or inseparably annexed to it." Id. at 19-20. For his views on the
Kentish Petitioners, see id. at 39-40.

85. [John Somers?], A Vindication of the Rights and Prerogatives of the Right
Honorable The House of Lords 6 (London 1701) (date in Narcissus Luttrell's hand, Sept.
9, on Folger Library copy).
86. [Swift], Contests and Dissensions, supra note 21, at 11.
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In the first months of 1702, the small Tory majority in the newlyelected House of Commons began the session by reviewing the results of
contested elections and finding against the Whig candidates. Among
these was Thomas Colepeper, who before challenging the Tory incumbent for Maidstone, had been one of the Kentish Petitioners and, indeed,
had achieved special acclaim for making "his bold Escape to kiss his
Wife." 8 7 In the course of resolving the disputed election against
Colepeper, the Commons voted that he had bribed electors, that he had
promoted a scandalous reflection upon the House (by criticizing it in
print), that he should be committed, and that the Attorney General
should prosecute him "for the said Crimes." 8
Having chastised this unrepentant Petitioner, the Tories in the weeks
that followed, attempted to pass resolutions vindicating themselves with
respect to the Kentish Petition fiasco and the failed impeachments. The
Whigs resisted, but eventually, on February 26, in a bitterly contested division, the Tories obtained some of their resolutions. One, aimed at the
Whiggish House of Lords, stated that it was a violation of privilege and
the English constitution "to assert, That the House of Commons is not
the only Representative of the Commons of England'; a second said that
"to assert, the House of Commons have no Power of Commitment, but of
their own Members" tended to subvert the constitution of the House of
Commons; a third insisted that to print or publish any89reflection on the
proceedings of the House was a violation of privilege.
Although unable to prevent these Tory victories, the Whigs fought
back. In a close vote of 235 to 221, they defeated a resolution "lt]hat the
Commons of England have not had right done them in the prosecution
of the Impeachments ... in the last parliament." 90 Moreover, they limited the broad implications of the Tory resolutions by means of two of
their own-one affirming the people's right to petition, the other, their
right to have a speedy trial. 9 1 This tense political crisis suggested to many
Englishmen, particularly Whigs, that the House of Commons had hardly
abandoned its broad claims of power.
87. Kentish Men, supra note 54, at 10. This quotation, however, is from a detractor:
A Man of Honour, ventrous of his Life,
Witness his bold Escape to kiss his Wife,
When he drawn home by her attractive Tail,
S-'d, and came back again to go to jayl.
Id. A rather different account is given in [Defoe], History, supra note 17, at 7.
88. 13 H.C. Jour. 735 (Feb. 7, 1702); 5 Narcissus Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation
of State Affairs 139 (1857). I have been unable to trace the piece allegedly written by
Colepeper, A Letter to the Freeholders & Freemen of England.
89. See 13 H.C. Jour. 767 (Feb. 26, 1702).
90. Letter from Peter King to John Locke (Feb. 26, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence
of John Locke 577 (E.S. de Beer ed., 1982).
91. The resolutions were:
4.... That it is the undoubted Right of the People of England to petition or
address to the King, for the Calling, Sitting, or Dissolving, of Parliaments; and for
the redressing of Grievances.
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Among those who followed the debate about the Kentish Petitioners
and took an interest in the subsequent resolutions of the House of
Commons was the philosopher whose analysis of unlimited government
appears to have contributed so much to the criticism of the Commons. It
has long been observed that Defoe seems to have drawn some of his arguments from Locke's Two Treatises of Government.92 However, not only was
Defoe almost certainly reading Locke, but also Locke was almost certainly
reading Defoe. In his study at Oates-the manor house of Francis and
Demaris Masham, who shared their home with the philosopher-John
Locke accumulated and surely read some of the most prominent pam5.... That it is the undoubted Right of every Subject of England, under any
Accusation, either by Impeachment, or otherwise, to be brought to a speedy Tryal
13 H.C.Jour. 767 (Feb. 26, 1702). The fourth resolution was a response to a resolution on
this subject proposed by Tories on the 17th. Letter from Peter King toJohn Locke (Feb.
17, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence of John Locke, supra note 90, at 568.
92. Such observations have focused on both Defoe's prose works and his poems-not
only those relating to the Kentish Petitioners but also others, earlier and later. For
example, see his True-Born Englishman of 1701 and his Jure Divino of 1706. See Chalmers,
supra note 24, at 15 (comparing Defoe with Locke rather than suggesting the derivation of
Defoe's arguments); 2 Walter Wilson, Memoirs of the Life and Times of Daniel DeFoe 418,
429 (London, Hurst, Chance, & Co. 1830) (quoting Chalmers); 1 William Lee, Daniel
Defoe: His Life and Recently Discovered Writings 55 (London, John Camden Hotten
1869) (quoting Chalmers's comparison of Defoe and Locke); Paula R. Backscheider,
Daniel Defoe His Life 162-63, 169, 171 (1989); Richard Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of
Government 269

(1987); Richard Ashcraft & M.M. Goldsmith, Locke, Revolution

Principles and the Formation of Whig Ideology, 26 Hist. J. 773, 798 (1983).
In order to show that Defoe was not a "radical," Manuel Schonhorn argues that
Defoe's pamphlet, The Original Power of the Collective Body of the People of England, "reveals
little direct indebtedness to the Two Treatisesof Government," and that many of the tenets in
the pamphlet "antedate Lockean principles or are in some opposition to Lockean
thought." Manuel Schonhorn, Defoe's Politics 79-80 (1991). Schonhorn's comments,
however, suggest that even he concedes some borrowing from Locke. Schonhorn's
reasons for finding "some opposition" between The Original Power and the Two Treatises
include arguments that ignore the circumstances in which Defoe was writing. For
example, Schonhorn points out that Defoe developed arguments against abuses of
legislative power, whereas Locke was responding to exaggerated claims of executive power.
See id. at 77-78. In contrast to Schonhorn, Ashcraft views The OriginalPoweras "one of the
most radical pamphlets [Defoe] ever wrote." Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics &
Locke's Two Treatises of Government 565 (1986).
Of course, an understanding of Defoe's use of the ideas of John Locke requires
consideration of all of Defoe's works from this period. It is undisputed that Defoe was
familiar with Locke's Two Treatises,and it seems fairly clear that in prose and poetry Defoe
drew upon some of the philosopher's basic ideas about the accountability of government
to the people and even upon some of his details, including phrases. See, e.g., supra notes
48 & 51. Indeed, Defoe cited Locke by name in his JureDivino. See Daniel Defoe, Jure
Divino, 10 (Book II) (London 1706) (written and even printed, in part, as early as 1704)
[hereinafter Defoe, Jure Divino]. In this connection, it is odd that, to counter any
impression that Defoe was "radical," Schonhorn examines The OiginalPower but does not
discuss the Lockean suggestions in Defoe's other works, including his Legion Memorialand
his History of the Kentish Petition, which Schonhorn seems to acknowledge were rather less
temperate than The Original Power. See Schonhorn, supra, at 81.
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phlets relating
to the Kentish Petitioners, including Defoe's Legion
Memaorial.93
Yet Locke did more than just read. His cousin, Peter King, was a

lawyer and Member of Parliament who regularly corresponded with
Locke about his handling of the philosopher's finances. 94 In February,

anticipating a momentous struggle in the Commons, Locke repeatedly
importuned King to stay in London rather than go on circuit in search of
business. 95 On February 17, King reported to his cousin with evident
pleasure that a deft procedural maneuver had defeated the Tories' attempt to pass their resolutions. 96 But the ever-cautious Locke was hardly
put at ease. He urged King:
Be not over confident because the 17th... went off... soe well.
[W]hat will not goe at one time may be tried an other when

number and 97strength appears on that side by the absence of

people away.
As Locke feared, the Tories soon tried again and brought the parliamen-

tary conflict to a climax. Writing late in the evening of the 26th, after the
Commons had passed their dramatic resolutions, King hastily reported
93. See John Harrison & Peter Laslett, The Library of John Locke (2d ed. 1971).

Locke acquired, inter alia, the following: Charles Davenant, The True Picture of a Modem
Whig (#3141); Daniel Defoe, Legion Memorial (#1962a); Daniel Defoe, Ye True-Born
Englishmen Proceed (#2993b) (cited here under one of its varied titles, A New Satyr On the
Parliament); Humphrey Mackworth, Vindication of the Rights of the Commons of England
(#1861);John SomersJura Populi Anglicani (#2272);Jonathan Swift, Discourse of the Contests
andDissensions Between the Nobles and the Commons in Athens and Rome (#1299);John Toland,
indicius Liberius (#2940). Of course, some of these had only brief, though not
unimportant, references to the dispute about the Petitioners. For the difficulty of
ascertaining which books Locke read, see Harrison & Laslett, supra, at 39. Undoubtedly,
Locke purchased other relevant pamphlets not recorded in his library lists. See id. at
53-54; see also Receipts from A. Churchhill to John Locke for 1701 and 1702, Bodleian
Library, Locke Ms., b.1, at fols. 251, 257-58.
94. Incidentally, King was appointed ChiefJustice of Common Pleas in 1714 and Lord
Chancellor in 1725-a position he held until 1733. See 11 Dictionary of National
Biography 144-47 (1900).
95. See Letter from John Locke to Peter King (Feb. 16, 1702), in 7 The
Correspondence ofJohn Locke, supra note 90, at 567; Letter from John Locke to Peter
King (Feb. 23, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence ofJohn Locke, supra note 90, at 573-74;
Letter from John Locke to Peter King (Feb. 26, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence ofJohn
Locke, supra note 90, at 576; Letter from John Locke to Peter King (Feb. 27, 1702), in 7
The Correspondence ofJohn Locke, supra note 90, at 578.
96. Letter from Peter King to John Locke (Feb. 17, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence
ofJohn Locke, supra note 90, at 567-68. King wrote: "This day was expected to be the
greatest day of this parliament, the busyness thereof being to consider the rights and
libertys of the house of Commons .... " Id. King closed his letter by explaining that the
matter was discussed in a committee of the whole house, where it died on procedural
grounds,
which is a very great mortification to some people, tho, not to
Your most affectionate Cosin and Servant. P. KING.
Id. at 568.
97. Letter from John Locke to Peter King (Feb. 23, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence
ofJohn Locke, supra note 90, at 573.
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the outcome of the debate and how he had voted, commenting, "I hope
the Crisis of this parliament is this day over, which hath been the greatest
day of this Session, and the greatest division that ever was, "9 8 Locke applauded his relative's public service:
Dear Cosin
I am more pleased with what you did for the publick the
day of your last letter, than for any thing you have done for me
in my private afairs, though I am very much beholding to you
for that too.99

Locke then offered to compensate King for his loss of business on the
circuit, if he would stay in London to help meet any "new Crisis" that
might be stirred up by the Tories. 10 0 Of course, this letter reveals more
about the strength than about the precise character of Locke's sentiments. 1 1 Nonetheless, in an essay that dwells upon some reverberations
of Locke's published ideas, his letter to his cousin may serve to remind us
that the broad claims of power made by the House of Commons-pugnaciously reiterated in its resolutions of February 26-were taken quite seriously, and not only by the philosopher whose arguments against unlimited power had been employed so prominently against that House.
In the context of this parliamentary struggle, Holt could hardly have
been unaware of the implications of his language about parliamentary
power. Already in May 1701-while the Kentish Petitioners remained in
prison, while the impeached lords awaited their trials, and while Defoe's
Legion Memorial provoked deep passions-Holt wrote to his "very good
[F] riend" William Penn:
98. Letter from Peter King to John Locke (Feb. 26, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence
ofJohn Locke, supra note 90, at 577.
99. Letter from John Locke to Peter King (Feb. 27, 1702), in 7 The Correspondence
ofJohn Locke, supra note 90, at 577-78.
100. Id. at 578. Note that since the 1690s, Locke had also influenced members of
Parliament through a "College" or political club that met at the Hen and Chickens in Red
Lion Street. See Maurice Cranston,John Locke: A Biography 393,415 & n.5 (1957). Lord
Somers was its patron. See John Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 40.
Locke's personal connections reached in many directions. For example, consider
Locke's friend, Lord Somers, who was Lord Chancellor from 1697 to 1700 and therefore
knew ChiefJustice Holt-although it was not always a friendly relationship or to Somers'
advantage. See Life of Lord ChiefJustice Holt, in 11 Law Mag. or Q. Rev. ofJurisprudence
24, 57 (1834). Somers also seems to have had unusual knowledge about Daniel Defoe's
plans. See Letter from Lord Somers to Lord Sunderland (Sept. 20, 1701), in 2
Miscellaneous State Papers from 1501 to 1726, supra note 53, at 448 (mentioning an
unnamed author who probably was Defoe). Such connections permit intriguing
speculation but in the absence of further information are not pursued here.
101. Locke surely was pleased on account of the vindication of Lord Somers and the
Whigs, on account of the prospects for their policy of toleration at home and resistance to
aggression abroad, and, perhaps, on account of the rebuke to legislative assertions of
judicial power-or for a combination of these reasons and others. In this connection,
note that in the middle of February, when Locke was beginning to urge King to stay in
London, King was writing to Locke about the Tory resolutions, but he wrote nothing about
Somers.
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Our affaires in this Kingdom, have been under some, tho noe
great, difficultys, ariseing from misapprehensions. But I beleive
we may reasonably expect a better understanding among us if it
please God, to blesse the King, w[i]th life and health, w[hi]ch is
to be the desire, of all Protesthe Interest, and therefore ought
10 2
tant Englishmen, to continue.
Eventually, Defoe and the Commons elevated the "difficultys" into a dramatic debate about the power of the Commons, culminating in the
February 26 resolutions. Less than a week later, on March 2, 1702, Holt
and his colleagues delivered their opinions in City of London v. Wood. As
will be seen, Holt applied to the City of London arguments that had already been employed against Parliament, especially the House of
Commons. Rather than make unfocused comments on speculative questions of constitutional law, Holt reflected upon problems already widely
familiar as a result of recent political events, and he addressed these
problems in terms of a theoretical analysis already applied to Parliament
by Defoe and other pamphleteers.
II.

HOLT ON NATURAL LAW AND THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT

Like Defoe and other champions of the Kentish Petitioners, Holt in
City of London v. Wood suggested that there were extrajudicial limitations
on parliamentary power. Thus, even while citing Bonham's Case, Holt

gave judicial recognition to a more substantial restraint on Parliament
than any that could be exerted by an English court. In so doing, he was
responding to the political crisis and constitutional problems publicized
by Somers and Defoe, and he employed the type of natural-law analysis
that, through their efforts, had already become closely linked to questions of parliamentary power. Yet Holt did not simply follow Somers or
Defoe. Drawing directly upon the writings of John Locke and, perhaps,
Samuel Pufendorf, Holt synthesized his own version of the natural-law
theory and its limitations on government..
Although Holt's ideas about natural law were vaguely suggested in
the reports of the opinion he delivered from the bench, they were far
more clearly stated in his own manuscript of his opinion. 10 3 His manu102. Letter fromJohn Holt to William Penn (May 23, 1701), in The Papers of William
Penn, microformed on Reel 9, frames 237-38 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1978).
Holt apparently recognized the full range of issues at stake in the crisis. The language
quoted above is suggestive of the problems that would be addressed in the Act of
Settlement, and Holt continued by alluding to the European context: "I shall be
exceedingly glad, ofseeingyou againe in England and to discourse w[i]th you, ofye famous
Enterprises, the follys as well as Policys of ye Grand Monarch." Id.
103. Holt's account of his opinion in City of London v. Wood survives in at least two
manuscripts. First, British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125 (formerly in the possession of
Chief Justice Lee) contains draft accounts in Holt's hand of his opinions in eleven cases,
one of which was City of London v. Wood. Second, British Library, Additional Ms. 35,979-81
(Hardwicke Collection) are three volumes in the hand of a professional copyist that collect

many of Holt's accounts of his own opinions, including City of London v. Wood (in
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script may have been prepared in part after he delivered his opinion from
the bench and therefore may reflect the benefit of some leisure and hindAdditional Ms. 35,980). Several of Holt's reports of his own opinions, however, including
some in Additional Ms. 34,125, are not represented in Additional Ms. 35,979-81. The
latter's report of City of London v. Wood appears to be a relatively careful copy of that in
Additional Ms. 34,125. The cases in 35,979-81 that also appear in Additional Ms. 34,125
appear to have been copied from the latter or, conceivably, from another copy of it. From
this, it may be surmised that the text in Additional Ms. 35,979-81 was compiled from
Holt's drafts, including what is now,Additional Ms. 34,125.
In at least some respects, however, Additional Ms. 35,979-81 is the better text. For
example, Holt's opinion in Lane v. Cotton & Frankland (KB. c.1701-02) appears in both
manuscripts, and the text in Additional Ms. 35,981, at fol. 89v, seems to be a copy of that in
Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 3r, except that, at the end of the opinion in Additional Ms.
35,981 there appears, still in the hand of the copyist: "N.B. What follows was omitted in
the delivery of the argument as superabundant to avoid prolixity and not because it was
improper." Additional Ms. 35,981, at fol. 106r. Cf. Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 25r. Indeed, additional arguments ensue.
With respect to City of London v. Wood, Holt does not appear to have altered the text
that appears in Additional Ms. 34,125. For purposes of this inquiry, the only substantial
differences between the two manuscripts are passages in Additional Ms. 34,125 crossed out
by Holt while drafting this manuscript and a few words inadvertently dropped by the copyist in Additional Ms. 35,980. Therefore, the draft in Holt's hand, Additional Ms. 34,125, is
the basis for the text here. Of course, all of the Holt manuscripts need further study.
Holt's literary efforts created a new genre in legal literature, the opinions of a single
judge prepared by him to be published as such and collected together for posterity. Ironically, however, Holt's opinions remain largely unpublished. Holt printed three of his prepared opinions at the end of his edition of Kelying's Reports. SeeJohn Kelying, A Report
of Divers Cases, ([John Holt] ed., 1708). The anonymous editor of two of Holt's opinions
published in 1837 hoped that their publication would "bring to light other original judgements of the same Chief Justice, prepared and corrected by himself." The Judgements
Delivered by the Lord ChiefJustice Holt in the Case of Ashby v. White and Others, and in
the Case of John Paty and Others Printed from Original Mss. xviii (1837) [hereinafter
Judgements]. Holt's are among the most important of English reports, yet almost three
hundred years since he prepared them for publication, they are still largely unknown. I
hope this article will prompt someone at last to undertake their publication.
Among the ChiefJustice's motives for writing his reports appear to have been a passion for the rule of law and a desire to have the last word. Both can be illustrated by Holt's
report of Rex v. Graep (K.B. 1697)-a case of perjury. Holt wrote:
I am sorry it so happens that so much pains and time should be spent in prosecuting this man who was convicted upon a full and clear evidence of so horrid a
crime as perjury and that it should have no better success. We must keep to the
rules of law, and if we should make a precedent in an ill mans case, at another
time it may be the case of one that is innocent, which we ought to be as carefull to
protect as zealous to punish the guilty. And the verdict in this case was very good,
yet we cannot give judgment for the king, because the information is bad.
Additional Ms. 35,981, at fol. 30r. At the end of his opinion, however, Holt added the
short, caustic paragraph: "Reversed by the arbitrary power of the Lords especially by the
influence of the Earl of Rochester notwithstanding any statute law or usage to the contrary." Id. at fol. 36v.
Holt's opinion from the bench in City of London v. Wood may be gauged by the printed
version in Modem Reports and another, manuscript report preserved and probably even
takenby the City's lawyers. 12 Mod. 699, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (1702); City of London Record
Office, Guildhall, City Extracts, Vol. I, item 33 (Collectiones Ex Libris Et Recordis Civitatis
London-a collection of precedents and other materials apparently compiled c.1713-17).
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sight, but it at least permits us to examine Holt's matured position on the
case-the position he sought to preserve for posterity-without fear that
a reporter has reduced detailed arguments to crude abbreviations. Holt's
manuscript shows that he had assimilated modem and particularly postHobbesian natural-law theory and could use it with considerable sophistication to expound popular limitations on parliamentary power.
A. Judge in One's Own Case
Questions about natural law and about limitations on government
arose in City of London v. Wood because they had become closely associated with the maxim that a person could not be both judge and partythat he could not be judge in his own case. In the early seventeenth
century, the idea that it was a violation of natural law for a person to be
judge in his own case was known to Englishmen from scattered English
precedents and other sources, including Justinian's Code and Jean
Bodin's R6publique.10 4 Against this background, Coke argued in Bonham's
Case that it was a contradiction or repugnancy for a person to be both
judge and party. Yet by the time of City of London v. Wood in the early
eighteenth century, and even already by the mid-seventeenth century, the
notion that a person could not be both judge and party was familiar not
only from Bonham's Case and the older sources but also from another,
rather different context: modern and particularly post-Hobbesian natural-aw theory. Largely through Hobbesian arguments, natural law increasingly came to be discussed, not as traditional right reason, but rather
as a mode of reasoning about the liberty of individuals in the state of
nature.1 0 5 In the course of arguing from assumptions about individuals
in the state of nature, Thomas Hobbes and others had reasoned that individuals should seek to form a government under which, among other
According to the manuscript report, Hatsell noted the objection that "ye Mai[o]r isJudge &
p[ar]ty" and asked "how canye Mai[o]r come before ye Mai[o]r. Thoye Mai[o]rbe n~o]tye
sole pl[ain]t[iff] or solejudge yet being a necessary& Essential pCar]ty &Judge." Id. at fols.
lr-2v. Lord Chief Baron Ward is reported to have said, "it might be brought in ye Sheriffs
court but as to ye Mai[o]rs court it is a doubt." Id. at fol. 2v. Holt is reported to have
argued:
But the main thing is yt this case is held before ye Mai[o]r & Ald[erme]n[.] [T]his
cannot be by ye rules of any law[.] [I] n no c[a]s[e] w[ha] tsoever can a man beJudge
&p[ar]tytoo[.] tAlnactofparl[iamen]t would be void sais myL[or]d Cook[.] [Y]e
would make a man so: an[d] it would be [to] alter the nature of things.
Id. at fol. 4r. (periods and other indications of abbreviation or contraction omitted).
104. See Codej. 3.5.; Code Th. 2.2.1.;Jean Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale
514 (Kenneth D. McRae ed., 1962) (reprinting 1606 translation). Incidentally, note that
Holt was familiar with Bodin, for in City of London v. Wood, he cited "Bodin de Republica.
Lib 3 ca[p] 7." British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 84r; see also infra notes 107 &
160.
105. Of course, some of Hobbes's predecessors and contemporaries made similar
arguments, but not as dramatically or influentially as Hobbes. For an account that
emphasizes the similarities, see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and
Development 119-32 (1993).
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things, no one was judge in his own case.10 6 On this basis, numerous
writers, most notably Locke, reasoned further that if a dispute arose between a people and their government, the latter could not decide between them, for it could not be judge in its own case. 10 7 Thus, the idea
that one could not be both judge and party came to play a profoundly
important role in the modern natural-law theory, particularly in its analysis of limited government.
In City of London v. Wood it was the Mayor of London who was judge
in his own case. The City had sued Wood to recover the penalty he owed
for refusing to accept his nomination as sheriff. Under City by-laws, the
fine for refusing such a nomination was 400 pounds, and many wealthy
individuals preferred to pay this amount than to undergo the expense
and trouble of serving. Therefore, in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, the City often used the nomination of sheriffs to raise substantial amounts of money from wealthy citizens. It was a means of "Fishing
for Sheriffs or for Money"-the point being that "they shou'd get Money
by him"-and many a candidate for sheriff was "pitcht upon.., not as a
Man they desir'd should serve, but as a Rich Man who would fine rather
than hold."' 0 8 One such was a tallowchandler named Thomas Woods
(truncated to "Wood" in the printed reports and also here), who was
nominated in the summer of 1698 and did not appear before the Court
of Aldermen to accept. 10 9 As in other cases of nominees both unwilling
106. See Thomas Hobbes, De Cive 70 (iii.21) (Howard Warrender ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1983) (1651) [hereinafter Hobbes, De Cive]. Although something like this position
had been suggested by pre-Hobbesian writers, it was given particular clarity and
prominence by Hobbes and subsequent theorists. For a notable late sixteenth-century
suggestion of this type of argument, see 1 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity 190-91 (I.x.4) (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1954) (1907).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 139-144. Locke had been preceded by others
who made related albeit less developed arguments. For example, Bodin briefly observed
that, "if it bee contrarie unto the law of nature, that the partie should be judge also; & That
the king is a partie in all causes which concern either the publicke or his own proper

patrimonie in particular, in which case he cannot be ajudge." Bodin, supra note 104, at
514. See also, e.g., [Philip Hunton], A Treatise of Monarchy (I.ii.7), in 9 Harleian
Miscellany 321, 332 (London 1810) (1689 reprint; first published 1643); Samuel
Rutherford, Lex, Rex: The Law and the Prince 210-12 (London 1644) [hereinafter
Rutherford, Lex, Rex].

108. [Daniel Defoe], The Livery Man's Reasons, Why he did not give His Vote for a
Certain Gentleman, either to be Lord Mayor, or, Parliament Man for the City of London 5
(London 1701). The typical attitudes of victims of the system are easy enough to imagine.
In the 1670s, the threat of being nominated as sheriff was sufficient to lead "severall
considerable persons within the Citty" to inform the City that they were "willing to be
admitted into the freedome [i.e., to become citizens] if they might be priviledgeed from
undergoing the Offices of Alderman and Sheriffe by the Space of seven years."
Memorandum dated March 24, 1673, City of London Record Office, Misc. Ms. 164.20.
Other individuals complained that they were nominated more than once. See Petition
dated Nov. 20, 1676, City of London Record Office, Misc. Ms. 164.20.
109. See Mayor v. Woods, City of London Record Office, Large Suits, Box 9, No. 2;
City of London [actually, Mayor] v. Long, Brief (Mayor's Ct., Oct. 15, [1700]), City of

London Record Office, Small Suits Box 1, No. 38 (reciting details of prior nominations in
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to serve and unwilling to pay the penalty, the City of London brought an
action of debt for its 400 pounds in the name of the Mayor, commonalty,
and citizens, and it brought this action in the Mayor's court, which nominally consisted of the Mayor and Aldermen of the City, although the
Court's judicial functions had long been in the hands of the Recorder. 110
summer of 1698, including Wood's); Brief of City, endorsed, "The City of London's Case.
Upon a Writ of Error in parliament. . ."; Mayor v. Markwick (H.L. 1708) (action against a
clockmaker, Markwick, who had posted bond that Wood would prosecute his writ of error
with effect, reciting details of Wood's nomination). Note that Wood may have been unable
rather than unwilling to serve as sheriff. See Marwick v. Mayor, 2 Brown 409, 1 Eng. Rep.
1030 (H.L. 1708).
For Wood's guild affiliation, see id. and The Lists of the Liveries of the Fifty six
Companies In the City of London... With an Account Who Poll'd, and who did not at the
Late Election of Members of Parliament for the said City of London list no. LI ([1700?]).
For a wealthy merchant called Thomas Woods, seeJ.M.B. Alexander, Economic and Social
Structures of the City of London c. 1700 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of London
1989) (copy on file at City of London Record Office); London Inhabitants Within the
Walls 1695 (D.V. Glass ed., 1966).
Other nominees in the summer of 1698 included John and Nicholas Vanacre (or
Vanacker), both of whom resisted and one of whom eventually brought his case to the
royal courts. See City of London v. Vanacre, 12 Mod. 269, 88 Eng. Rep. 1314 (K.B. 1699);
Holt, K.B. 431, 90 Eng. Rep. 1137; British Library, Additional Ms. 35,981, at fol. 61r (K.B.
1701) (holding for the city).
110. As Chief Baron Ward noted in his opinion, the court was not, in fact, held before
the Mayor and Aldermen:
Objection. Though the stile of the Court be before the mayor and alder men, yet
they never are there, but all is done before the recorder, who may or may not be
free of the city.... Answer. This were to take an averment against the record,
where by it appears that the Court is held before the mayor and alder men.
City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 674, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1595 (1702).
Incidentally, in the summer of 1701, less than a year prior to the judgment in City of
London v. Wood, the Kentish Petitioners may have been the beneficiaries of the shrieval
nominations that had given rise to Wood's difficulties. Upon their release in late June
1701, the Kentish Petitioners were honored by Whigs at a dinner at Mercers Hall, where,
according to a hostile contemporary, Daniel Defoe was seated next to them. See The
Legionites Plot: or An Account of Some Late Designs To Create a Misunderstanding
betwixt the King and his People 17-18 (London 1702). To pay for the dinner, the City or
at least some unscrupulous Whigs may have misused the appointment of sheriffs. More
precisely, individuals in the City may have threatened to nominate persons who did not
contribute relatively small sums for the cost of the supper. According to a very hostile and
therefore not altogether reliable Tory pamphleteer, as soon as Parliament was prorogued
on June 23 and the five Petitioners were set at liberty, the "Legionites" resolved:
that Money be collected to make a noble Treat for the said worthy Members,....
and accordingly some of the Sheriff-makers of London were ordered to collect
the said Money, which I am told they did to the value of 200 1. tho some they
importun'd to join with them had more Wit than to do it.
Id. at 17. As the nomination of sheriffs was a common method of raising money, this may,
perhaps, have been a suggestion that Whigs in the City used the shrieval nominations to
extort money from many of "the Guinea-droppers" who attended the Petitioners' dinner.
Regardless of whether Holt knew of these dining arrangements, he could not have been
unaware that by condemning the City and the Whigs, he could, with unimpeachable
impartiality, censure the Tories' use of the House of Commons.
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Holt disposed of the case in a way that allowed him to discuss the
Mayor's dual role and its parliamentary implications in the relative safety
of dicta. Upon the defendant's writ of error, Holt examined, first,
whether the defendant should have been allowed to wage his law"' and,
second, whether the record could be amended to correct what "doth appear to be a discontinuance."" 2 According to Holt, the defendant had
no right to wage his law, but the record's suggestion of a discontinuance
was fatal and could not be amended. Having held for the defendant on
the second question, Holt might have stopped. He went on, however, to
address what he considered to be the major issue in the case, whether the
Mayor could be both a party and a judge:
The third point is now to be considered, which though by
what hath been said may appear unnecessary to be spoke to at
this time, but if omitted the judgment in this case will be the
same, yet forasmuch as the discussing and settling of it will be of
great consequence, therefore out of a just respect to the City, I
think it ought to receive a determination to the intent that there
may never be the like occasion to bring it into question any
more.
The question is whether this action be well commenced
and brought
in the court held before the Lord Mayor and
13
Aldermen.
It was in dicta on this question about the proceeding before the Mayor
and Aldermen that Holt explained the possibility of limits on
Parliament's power.
111. That is, to defend himself with compurgators.
112. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 67r. According to Holt:
The first (which was the principle and was indeed the cause of this writ of

error) is whether, in an action of debt brought by the Mayor and commonalty
and citizens of London for the penalty of this act of Common Council, the
defendant might wage his law.
The second did arise upon the record certified to us in which there doth
appear to be a discontinuance, which if it cannot be amended, must be fatal to
thejudgment. Therefore considering the circumstances of the case, the question
is, whether it can be amended.
Id.
As I hope that Holt's opinions will eventually be published in their entirety, I have
taken the liberty of quoting them here in a way that will make my excerpts easily readable
while also faithful to the original. Orthography, spelling, punctuation and capitalization
are silently modernized. Most contractions or abbreviations are completed silently, and
ampersands are spelled out. For the sake of the reader, I have altered or deleted much of
Holt's punctuation and have siler~tly added new punctuation that roughly reduces Holt's
paragraphs to plausible modem sentences. In transcribing Additional Ms. 34,125, I have
often deferred to the interpretation of the early eighteenth-century copyist who prepared
Additional Ms. 35,980.
113. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 83r. As Holt observed at the
beginning of his report, one of the three questions before the court was "[w]hether the
Mayor and commonalty and citizens can bring an action of debt for the recovery of this
penalty in the court held before the Mayor and Aldermen." Id. at fol. 67r.
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In objecting to the City's pursuit of its action in the Mayor's Court,
Wood had made two exceptions. The first was that the suit was brought
to obtain a forfeiture for the Corporation of London, of which the Mayor
and Aldermen were members. This was not quite a claim that the complainant was also the judge, and Holt did not consider it a sufficient objection.1 1 4 In contrast, the second exception did allege an identity of
judge and party:
But the second exception that hath been taken is that the
suit, being by the Mayor, Aldermen and citizens, can't be before
the Mayor and Aldermen, which was a question never stirred in
Westminster Hall, but did arise upon the debate of the case in
this place [i.e., Guildhall]. I am of opinion that the Mayor and
commonalty and citizens cannot sue in a court held before the
Mayor and Aldermen, because no man can be judge and party.
15
In this case, as the Lord Mayor is judge so he is a party too.'
On this second exception, Holt agreed with the defendant.
B.

Counter-Examples

Holt began his argument that the Mayor could not be judge in his
own case by stating some counter-examples and responding to them. In
so doing, he drew upon the ideas ofJohn Locke and hinted at the illegality of the imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners.
According to Holt, some persons had rejected the proposition that
no man can be both judge and party:
That no man can be judge and party I thought had been a
proposition so plain and so universally true, that as it could not
admit of any contradiction, so it was not capable of any qualification. But ... in another place it hath been said that in some
cases a man might be judge and party, especially by the laws of
England where a man is only to judge of6 the law and not of the
fact, though I confess I know not any."
Among the places in which there were suggestions that a person could be
both judge and party were various legal cases, and several of these were
listed in the section on 'Judges" in Henry Rolle's Abridgment of 1668,
which Holt cited later in his opinion." 7 The issue was also suggested,
although not directly mentioned, in Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha,published in 1680. In this notorious defense of absolute monarchy, Filmer
114. See British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fols. 83r-86r. The printed report,

in contrast, says that the first exception to the by-law was "that it inflicts a penalty for the
benefit of those that make the law." City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 686, 88 Eng.
Rep. 1592, 1601 (1702).
115. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fols. 86v-87r. Holt also said that this
exception was that "the Mayor who is ajudge is the head of the Corporation and is a party
as well as a judge." Id. at fol. 83r.
116. Id. at fol. 87r.
117. 2 Henry Rolle, Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases 92-93 (London 1668); see
citation by Holt in British Library, Additional Ms.34,125, at fol. 90r.
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argued that monarchs had an unlimited paternal power over their sub18
jects, including a right of judgment.
When Holt proceeded to list some counter-examples-instances in
which it might be thought that a person was, in fact, judge in his own
case-he began with a situation strikingly reminiscent of Filmer's position on paternal authority. If a parent could correct his children, he
might seem to be judge in his own case:
Some instances to prove it not to be against the law of nature for
a man to be judge and party are that of a parent over his children by giving them correction for offending him. Response:
that is not so, for the parent corrects his child not for an offence
against him, but because he [i.e., the child] hath done amiss,
for the parent gets nothing by it
and that is for the childs good,
9
but the childs reformation."1
Holt's response was that parents corrected their children for the benefit
and reformation of the children and consequently did not do so as parties, let alone judges. Both Holt's initial counter-example and this response were taken directly from Locke's reply to Filmer in the philosopher's Two Treatises of Government.
Although Holt's counter-example-his suggestion that a parent
might be judge and party-generally reflected Filmer's arguments, it was
derived, not directly from Filmer, but rather from Locke's characterization of Filmer. Filmer had asserted that patriarchical authority was unlimited, but he had not specifically stated that a parent was, in relation to
his children, judge in his own case. On the contrary, it was Locke who
attributed this position to Filmer.
118. See Robert Filmer, Patriarcha at iii.10, in John Locke, Two Treatises of
Government 292-94 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1956). Filmer wrote that "the lawmaker should
be trusted with the application or interpretation of the laws." Id. at 292.
Elsewhere, Filmer wrote that the judgments of kings "are supreme in all courts."
Robert Filmer, The Free-holders Grand Inquest in Patriarcha and Other Writings 114
(Johann P. Sommerville ed., 1991). He also wrote: "Not only the law-maker, but also the
'sole judge of the people is the king,' in the judgment of Bracton." Id. at 118. Also: "Now
if you ask the author [Hunton] who shall be judge whether the monarch transcend his
bounds, and of the excesses of the sovereign power, his answer is: 'there is an impossibility
of constituting ajudge to determine this last controversy.'" Robert Filmer, The Anarchy,
in Patriarcha and Other Writings, supra, at 150 (citations omitted). Filmer eventually
provided his own analysis:
Who mustjudge? If the monarch himselfjudge, then you destroy the frame of
the state and make it absolute, saith our author; and he gives his reason: for, to
define a monarch to a law, and then to make him judge of his own deviations
from that law, is to absolve him from all law... [Ilf the king be judge, then he is
no limited monarch; if the people be judge, then he is not monarch at all. So
farewell limited monarchy. Nay, farewell all government if there be no judge.
Id. at 151.
For a much more moderate patriarchal theory, see William Temple, An Essay Upon
the Original and Nature of Government, in Miscellanea 45 (London 1680) (written in
1672).
119. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 87r.
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Locke argued that an absolute sovereign, such as one with the paternal authority described by Filmer, was a particularly dangerous example
of a person who was judge in his own case. Locke summarized Filmer's
position by observing:
This Fatherly Authority then, or Right of Fatherhood, in our
A[uthor]'s sence is a Divine unalterable Right of Sovereignty,
whereby a Father or a Prince hath an Absolute, Arbitrary, Unlimited, and Unlimitable Power, over the Lives, Liberties, and
Estates of his Children and Subjects; so that he may take or
alienate their Estates, sell, castrate, or use their Persons as he
pleases, they being all his Slaves, and he Lord or1 20Proprietor of
every Thing, and his unbounded Will their Law.
Having described Filmer's version of parental power as an absolute
power, Locke later explained the perils of absolute power by arguing that
an absolute monarch was an especially undesirable type of judge in his
own case:
Absolute Monarchs are but men, and if Government is to be the
Remedy of those Evils, which necessarily follow from Mens being Judges in their own Cases, and the State of Nature is therefore not be endured, I desire to know what kind of Government
that is, and how much better it is than the State of Nature,
where one Man commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be
Judge in his own Case, and may do to all his Subjects whatever
he pleases... ? Much better it is in the State of Nature wherein
Men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: And
other Case, he
if he thatjudges, judges amiss in his own, or12any
1
is answerable for it to the rest of Mankind.
In other words, in the state of nature everyone was judge in his own case.
If people formed government to avoid the "evils" of such a condition,
they would be foolish to adopt an absolute monarchy, for under such a
government, the monarch would be judge in his own case and, indeed,
would have a monopoly of that arbitrary power. In this way, Locke attributed to Filmer the position that the patriarchical authority of an absolute
monarch made him judge in his own case. Apparently drawing on
Locke's characterization of Filmer, Holt treated parental power as a
counter-example to the proposition that a party could not be his own
judge.
In defending the maxim that a person could not be both judge and
party, Holt drew not only his initial counter-example but also his response from Locke. Having noted the possibility that a parent might be
120. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 182 (I.ii.9). ProfessorJames Tully notes
of this passage: "When Locke sets up Filmer's right as a target he emphasizes the absolutist
and wholly irresponsible concept of individual proprietorship it necessarily embodies."
James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries 57 (1980). It

should be noted, however, that Filmer himself was not unaware of some of the implications
of his theory. See supra note 118.
121. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 317 (II.ii.13).
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considered a judge in his own case, Holt insisted this was "not so, for the
parent corrects his child not for an offence against him, but because he
[i.e., the child] hath done amiss, and that is for the childs good for the
parent gets nothing by it but the childs reformation." The continental
philosophers Grotius and Pufendorf, among others, had said that parents
corrected their children for the benefit of the children and to reform
them. But it had been John Locke-provoked by Filmer-who had used
this argument about parental power to demolish the suggestion that parents were judges in their own case. 122 Thus, Holt appears to have drawn
122. For suggestions of the positions taken by Locke and Holt, see Hugo Grotius, Dc
Jure Belli Ac Pads Libri Tres 231-33 (Il.v.1-6) (James B. Scott ed. & Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1925); Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo 910-33 (VI.ii),
particularly at 913-15 (VI.ii.4) (James B. Scott ed., C.H. Oldfather &W.A. Oldfather trans.,
1934); Samuel Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civisjuxta Legem Naturalem Libri Duo
97 (IIIii.108) (James B. Scott ed. & Frank G. Moore trans., 1927); Samuel Pufendorf,
ElementorumJurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo 281-83 (II.v.8-10) (James B. Scott ed.
& W.A. Oldfather trans., 1931).
Locke wrote:
But what reason can ... advance this Care of the Parents due to their Off-spring
into an Absolute ArbitraryDominion of the Father, whose power reaches no farther,
than by such a Disipline as he finds most effectual to give such strength and
health to their Bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their Minds, as may best fit his
Childern to be most useful to themselves and others .... Nay, this power so little
belongs to the Fatherby any peculiar right of Nature, but only as he is Guardian of
his Children, that when he quits his Care of them, he loses his power over them,
which goes along with their Nourishment and Education ....
Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 352-53 (11.6.64-65); see also id. at 347 (II.vi.56),
348 (II.vi.58) & notes.
Locke's friend, James Tyrrell, who sometimes adopted arguments from Locke, made
similar assumptions about parental power. In general, he followed Grotius's division of a
child's life into three periods but emphasized the reformatory purposes of parental
correction. Some details, however, suggest a relationship to Locke. In the second period,
when the child had the use of reason, "the Father hath power to correct his Son, if he
prove negligent, or disobedient; since this Correction is for his advantage, to make him
more careful and diligent another time, and to subdue the stubborness of his Will: ....
[T]his Duty is not by force of any absolute Subjection." James Tyrrell, Patriarcha Non
Monarcha, supra note 51, at 19. According to Tyrrell:
[T]he highest Right of Parents in their Children, doth arise merely from their
[T]he highest Right which
discharge of [their] great Duty of Education ....
Parents can have in their Children is not merely natural, from generation; but
acquir'd by their performance of that nobler part of their Duty. And so the
highest Obedience which Children owe their Parents, proceeds from that
Gratitude and Sense they ought to have of the great obligation they owe their
Parents, for the trouble and care they put them to in their Education.... [T]his
right in the Child, or power over it, extends no farther than as it conduces to this
end, that is, the good and preservation thereof: and when this Rule is
transgressed, the Right ceases.
Id. at 16-17. Unlike Locke, Tyrrell did not directly treat the argument against unlimited
parental authority as an argument against the possibility that a person could be judge in
his own case. Incidentally, note that Holt, like Tyrrell and especially Locke, was content
(when not specifically responding to Filmer's patriarchical formula) to discuss the
authority of the parents without distinguishing between the father and the mother.
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his first counter-example and his response to it from Locke's characterization of, and reply to, Filmer.
Holt continued by proposing and responding to other counter-examples, including the examples of an officer executing military justice
and a court inflicting punishment for contempt. In the course of showing that such an officer and such a court were not judges in their own
cases, Holt suggested that the privileges of the House of Commons were
not so extensive as to justify the imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners.
Another instance is of an officer of an army. If a soldier
assaults him he may proceed against him and take away his life.
Response: That is not for offending him but for breaking the
laws and rules of military discipline. And if that officer consider
his own passion and revenge he is less fit to be a judge. But
none will say that by the court marshal held before that officer
he can sue for satisfaction of the injury.
The like for an affront or contempt to a court of justice:
The court may commit and punish the offender.
1. That is an offence to the government and the fine goes
to the government.
2. And though the offence be against the court punishing
they are not parties. Suppose in the Common Pleas it should be
that the justices of the Common Pleas complain to or before the
justices of the Common Pleas or the barons of the Exchequer.
Therefore they are not parties but judges only.
3. No more are the two houses of Parliament judges in
their own cases, do they complain to themselves, but one of
them [i.e., an individual member] that is injured 123
complains to
the rest. Besides no satisfaction is there sued for.
In considering whether a court was judge in its own case when it punished a contempt, Holt examined the parliamentary adjudication of cases
of parliamentary privilege, but he concluded that the Houses of
Parliament were not judges in their own case. The Lords or Commons
proceeded only when an individual member "that is injured complains to
the rest"-a description of proceedings for breach of privilege that would
have precluded the imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners for their injury to the House of Commons as a whole. Moreover, "no satisfaction is
12 4
there sued for"-a point that Holt would later make in Ashby v. White
and a reminder that the Commons could not act asjudges. Holt's narrow
treatment of parliamentary privilege-as involving complaints of injury
See also the writing of Thomas Hunt, discussed by GordonJ. Schochet, Patriarchalism

in Political Thought 198 (1975).
123. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fols. 87r-88r. He continued:
It hath been said that in case of wager of law a man isjudge. That sure is a
very hard assertion. When he is put to wage his law or when he puts himself to it
he discharges himself by his own oath, but it was never thought that he was his
own judge, but the compurgators that he produces may be reasonably thought so.
Id. at fol. 88r.
124. For Ashby, see infra text accompanying notes 168-170.
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by individual members of a House rather than by the House itself and as
providing no satisfaction for an injury-not only allowed him to maintain
that a person could not be judge in his own case but also conveniently
avoided any suggestion that Holt approved of the recent abuses of claims
of privilege. Thus, already in responding to these counter-exampleswhether parental authority, military justice, or contempt of court-Holt
made use of the ideas of John Locke and suggested his concern about
abuses of parliamentary privilege.
B.

NaturalLaw Limitations on Parliament

After replying to these very specific counter-examples, Holt
presented a more general argument that a person could not be judge in
his own case. Drawing upon the modem natural-law theory, Holt argued
that it was a contradiction for a person to be judge and party, and he
thereby hinted at extrajudicial limitations on Parliament.
It will be recalled that by the time Holt wrote his opinion in City of
London v. Wood, the idea that one could not be judge in one's own case
had become an important part of modern natural-law theory. In the last
half of the seventeenth century, largely through the influence of Hobbes,
natural law was frequently understood as a mode of reasoning about the
use of natural liberty-natural liberty being the freedom of individuals in
the state of nature. According to this modem theory, the state of nature
was the condition in which there was no civil government, in which individuals were equally free from subjugation to each other and in which,
therefore, each person was judge in his own case. In this state, as described by Hobbes, Locke, and others, individuals depended upon themselves to punish or seek reparation for injuries, and they were restrained
only by their reasoning about how to use their freedom, this reasoning
being the law of nature. As Locke put it, "Men living together according
to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge
25
between them, is properly the State of Nature."'
With this modem natural-law theory, Holt explained why it was contradictory for a person to be judge in his own case, and Holt began by
distinguishing between a statute that made a man judge in his own case
and a statute that allowed a man to do as he pleased:
Since then it hath [by] some been laboured to maintain that
proposition, that in some cases a man may be ajudge in his own
cause, it belongs to me to show by reason and authority, that no
man in any civil state can be judge and party too.
It is true that saying [in] 8 [Coke's] Rep[orts] 118 Bonhams
Case may seem to be carried too far, that an act of Parliament
can't make a man to be judge in his own cause, yet it is not so
harsh a saying as some may imagine, but it is a true and ortho125. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 321 (II.iii.19); see also id. at 346
(II.vi.54).
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dox proposition, for ajudge and a party are in their nature and
institution different and distinct, for the being of the one doth
necessarily exclude the other. Therefore an act of Parliament
that should make a man to be ajudge in his own case would be
an absolute contradiction. But an act of Parliament may be
[made] to leave a man at liberty to do what he will and to exempt
him from any judicature and return him to a state of nature.
For by the law of nature before the foundation of states and
erection of tribunals every man that was injured by another
might seek his own satisfaction, but it was still with that caution
that he kept himself within the bounds of reason, otherwise he
made himself obnoxious to others for his excess. But that was
not as ajudge that he12 did
it [i.e., sought his own satisfaction], but
6
for want of a judge.
Not only Bonham's Case but also the very nature of judges and parties
implied that a statute making a man judge in his own case was "an absolute contradiction." A statute, however, could allow a man "to do what he
127
will" and thus "return him to a state of nature."
Of course, a statute that made a person judge in his own case was not
substantively different from a statute that allowed the person to do as he
pleased, and therefore both statutes could be understood to return him
to the state of nature. Yet Holt, perhaps following Pufendorf, carefully
took the traditional position that a person in the state of nature was not
judge in his own case, and on this basis, Holt attributed different consequences to the two types of statute.' 28 Possibly to accommodate Coke's
opinion in Bonham's Case, Holt found it convenient to insist upon a contrast between a statute that made a man judge in his own case (which, at
least according to Coke, was void) and a statute that allowed a man to do
126. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fols. 87v-88r. Incidentally, a few years
earlier in an anonymous case before Holt, it is reported that: "The Mayor of Hereford was
laid by the heels, for sitting in judgment in a cause where he himself was lessor of the
plaintiff in ejectment, though he by the charter was sole Judge of the Court." 1 Salk. 396,
91 Eng. Rep. 343 (KB. 1698).
127. For Defoe's account of how the Commons' Serjeant claimed to have authority to
do, in his discretion, what he wished to the Petitioners, see supra text accompanying notes
65-66.
128. Pufendorf had written:
Now among those who live in natural liberty there is no judge who may by his
authority settle and dispose of the disputes that arise.... Indeed, Hobbes, De
Cive, chap. i, § 9, makes each man in a natural state the judge of his own affairs.
But that statement only allows this meaning: whoever does not have a superior by
whom he is controlled, conducts his affairs at his own discretion, and decides by
his own judgement upon the means that concern his own preservation. For even
though another man may try to decide them, yet since he has no authority to
force his opinon upon me, whether and how far I am willing to accept his counsel
will depend upon my own judgement and decision, and thus I will ultimately be
responsible for the ordering of my own actions, which must, of course, be
properly governed according to natural law.
Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, supra note 122, at 826
(V.xiii.2).
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as he pleased (which, according to Holt, returned him to the state of
nature). It was in support of this distinction that Holt had to deny that a
person in the state of nature was judge in his own case-a traditional
position that was slightly awkward for Holt because it could be viewed as a
deviation from the more modern, Hobbesian and Lockean ideas upon
which he would rely in his next paragraph.
Having suggested a distinction more subtle than substantive between
a statute that made a man judge in his own case and a statute that allowed
him "to do what he will," Holt explained why a man could not be judge in
his own case. According to Hobbes, natural law was the basis of the reasoning that led men to form civil government, and it was contrary to this
reasoning for a man to be judge in his own case. As already noted, Locke
further reasoned that an absolute monarch was a particularly undesirable
type ofjudge in his own case and that therefore absolute monarchy was
inconsistent with the end of civil society:
Absolute Monarchy, which by some Men is counted the only
Government in the World, is indeed inconsistentwith Civil Society,
and so can be no Form of Civil Government at all. For the end of
Civil Society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of
the State of Nature, which necessarily follow from every Man's
beingJudge in his own Case, by setting up a known Authority, to
which every one of that Society may Appeal upon any Injury received, or Controversie that may arise, and which every one of
the Society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have
not such an Authority to Appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of
Nature. And so is every Absolute Prince in respect of those who
are under his Dominion.129
Although facing parliamentary rather than monarchical power, Holt similarly argued that it was inconsistent with the end of civil societies for a
Parliament to make a man judge in his own case:
But it is contrary to the principles and the end of all commonwealths and civil societies for a man to be allowed to be a
judge in his own cause. To prevent the great inconveniences
that ensued from the mere state of nature, men formed themselves into civil societies and did resign up themselves to a state
of subjection. And though it is not supposed that a Parliament
will ever make a man judge in his own cause, yet if it should do
so, it is repugnant to law, and if a man should be allowed by act
of Parliament to do what should seem good in his own eyes, the
government [would be] dissolved and the man or those who
have that liberty are returned to a state of nature. It would be
such a law that should entitle one man to invade the life or
property of another.
The making therefore [of] a judge to determine between
the parties is necessarily meant another person than the parties
129. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 369 (II.vii.90).
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themselves. The laws of the kingdom or community are that
there should be one or more judges; otherwise the government
[would] be dissolved.' 30
While reluctant to follow Locke in sayingthat a person in the state of
nature was judge in his own case, Holt argued in accord with the philosopher that it was "contrary" to the "end" of "civil societies" for a man to be
judge in his own case and that men "formed themselves into civil societies" in order to "prevent the great inconveniences" of the "state of nature."' 1 If Parliament were to make a man judge in his own case, it
would be "repugnant to law"-at least, that is, to the reasoning that constituted the law of nature. Therefore, Parliament's designation of a person as a judge "is necessarily meant another person than the parties."
The only alternative interpretation would be that there was no judge between the parties-that the putative judge was a person left free to do
"what should seem good in his own eyes"-and this would return him to
the state of nature. As Locke had said, "if any Man may do, what he
thinks fit, and there be no Appeal on Earth, for Redress or Security
against any harm he shall do; I ask, Whether he be not perfectly still in
the State of Nature.' 3 2 Although it could not be supposed that a
130. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 89r. (The words "would be" and
"would" added in brackets are supplied from Additional Ms. 35,980, at fols. 16r & 16v.)
Holt followed this with a detailed refutation of some of the instances in which it had been
suggested that person could be both judge and party, including some of the cases listed in
Rolle's Abridgment: "And though a judge of a court where there be other judges of the
court besides himself sues or be sued in that court, he as to that cause ceases to be ajudge.
And the court as to his cause is not held before him...." British Library, Additional Ms.
34,125, at fol. 89r.
131. In addition to the passage from Locke quoted in the text accompanying note
129, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 109 (i.15) (Richard Tuck ed., 1991); Locke, Two
Treatises, supra note 32, at 316 (II.ii.13). Pufendorf is considerably less succinct. See
Samuel Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem Libri Duo, supra
note 122, at 102 (II.i.10); Samuel Pufendorf, Dejure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, supra
note 122, at 959 (VII.i.6).
132. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 374 (II.vii.94). This passage was
preceeded by:
[T] he People... could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in Civil Society,
till the Legislature was placed in collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate,

Parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became
subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he himself, as
part of the Legislative had established: nor could any one, by his own Authority,
avoid the force of the Law, when once made, nor by any pretence of Superiority,
plead exemption, thereby to License his own, or the Miscarriages of any of his
Dependants. No man in Civil Society can be exempted from the Laws of it. For ....
Id. at 373-74 (II.vii.94). The passage in the text was followed by: "and so can be no part or
Member of that Civil Society: unless any one will say, the State of Nature and Civil Society are
one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a Patron of Anarchy
as to affirm." Id. at 374 (II.vii.94). Locke also wrote that the people's authorization of the
legislative to make laws "puts Men out of a State of Nature into that of a Commonwealth, by
setting up ajudge on Earth, with Authority to determine all the Controversies, and redress
the Injuries, that may happen to any Member of the Commonwealth; which Judge is the
Legislative, or Magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of Men,
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Parliament would ever make a person judge in his own case and therefore
statutes were not to be so construed, if Parliament were to allow a man "to
do what seem good in his own eyes," he would be "returned to the state of
nature."
In making this argument, Holt was unambiguous about the consequences of a statute that allowed a man to do what seemed good in his
own eyes: "[G]overnment [would] be dissolved." According to Locke,
"Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the
State of Nature, which must certainly be Great, where Men may be Judges
in their own Case." 133 This absence of "a known and indifferent Judge"
was one of three characteristics of the state of nature that impeded
achievement of "the ends of political society and government." 134 It was
an obstacle to the preservation of "Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I
call by the general Name, Property."135 When describing how
"[g] overnment may be dissolved," Locke briefly returned to the subject of
judges: "Where there is no longer the administration ofJustice, for the
securing of Mens Rights.... there certainly is no Government left.... In
these and the like Cases, when the Government is dissolved, the People are at
liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new Legislative .... ,,136
Similarly, Holt argued that without ajudiciary-if there were not "one or
more judges"-government would be "dissolved." Even if only one man
were "allowed by act of Parliament to do what should seem good in his
own eyes, the government would be dissolved, and the man or those who
have that liberty are returned to a state of nature." Of course, Holt disposed of the case on other grounds and even in his dicta avoided direct
discussion of revolution or resistance. Yet educated Englishmen at the
close of the seventeenth century were not apt to hear or say that "the
government would be dissolved" without recognizing the possibilities to
which these words might refer.
D.

The ProhibitionAgainst BeingJudge in One's Own Case and the
Development of Modern Natural-Law Theory

In both Bonham's Case and City of London v. Wood, a party had attempted to be its own judge. Yet whereas in the 1610 decision, Coke
however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the
state of Nature" Id. at 369 (I.vii.89).
133. Id. at 316 (II.ii.13).
134. Id. at 396 (II.ix.125). Locke wrote:
In the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferentJudge, with Authority to
determine all differences according to the established Law. For every one in that
state being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature, Men being partial
to themselves, Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too
much heat, in their own Cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to
make them too remiss, in other Mens.
Id.
135. Id. at 395 (II.ix.123).
136. Id. at 459 (II.xix.219-20).
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concluded that a contradictory statute could be declared void, in the
1702 decision, Holt alluded to a far more effective limitation on government. This difference between the ChiefJustices' opinions reflected the
seventeenth-century development of modern ideas of natural law.
For Holt, the law according to which a man could not be judge in his
own case and according to which "government would be dissolved" was
the modern version of natural law, the law of human nature. It was the
law of self-preservation that existed "before the foundation of statutes and
erection of tribunals," according to which "every man that was injured by
another might seek his own satisfaction, but... with that caution that he
kept himself within the bounds of reason." This law, concerned with the
reasoned pursuit of self-preservation, was what permitted human beings
to protect themselves from and punish anyone who would "invade" their
"life or property." This was the law that led to the formation and, on
occasion, the dissolution of government. Thus, for Holt, the law that limited Parliament was hardly the traditional notion of right reason but
rather was the reasoning about the liberty of individuals in the state of
nature and about the preservation of that liberty through the creation of
civil government. Although Holt employed this newer version of natural
law to show that a statute could be a "contradiction," he also explained
that this natural law could be the basis for the dissolution of government
and the return of individuals to the state of nature.
It may be thought ironic that Holt cited Bonham's Case in an opinion
that suggested extrajudicial limitations on government, but it is not altogether surprising, for by the late seventeenth century the notion that a
man could not be judge in his own case had been elevated from an observation about a particular abuse of power in a court to a central metaphor
of English political theory. Whereas Coke had applied the maxim to an
actual judicial body, seventeenth-century philosophers developed the
3 7
maxim as a description of a broader problem of political power.'
Hobbes had described absolute sovereignty as a means of avoiding a condition in which individuals were judges in their own cases-as a means of
providing an arbiter among individuals who, in the state of nature, were
all judges in their disputes with one another. 3 8 Locke and others responded that even the monarch could not be judge in his own case; they
applied the principle not only to subjects but also to government and
thereby made it the central explanation of the right of revolution.' 3 9 In
controversies between subjects and their government, there seemed to be
137. Some earlier writers suggested this broader use of the maxim but did not
develop it or give it the prominence it achieved in the mid-seventeenth century. For one
such earlier source, see Bodin, supra note 104.
138. See Hobbes, De Cive, supra note 106, at 94 (vi.8); Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note
131, at 109 (i.15), 168 (ii.23). For recent discussion of Hobbes's views on this issue, see
James R. Stoner, Jr., Common Law and Liberal Theory: Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of
American Constitutionalism 109-11 (1992).
139. See Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 316-17 (1I.ii13). Tyrrell struggled
with the problem but was not as bold as Locke:
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no judge who was not a party, and therefore Locke concluded his Two
Treatises by asking "the common Question... Who shall be Judge whether
the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust?"' 40 To this, Locke
first gave a practical answer: "I reply, The People shall be Judge; for who
shall be Judge whether his Trustee or Deputy acts well, and according to
the Trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him...."41 Then Locke

refined his response: "But farther, this Question, (Who shall be Judge?)
cannot mean, that there is no Judge at all. For where there is no Judicature on Earth, to decide Controversies amongst Men, God in Heaven is
Judge- He alone, 'tis true, is Judge of the Right.' 4 2 Nonetheless, continued Locke, "every Man is Judge for himself ...whether another hath put
himself into a State of War with him, and whether he should appeal to
the SupremeJudge, asJephthadid."' 43 Because no one could be judge in
his own case, "the Appeal lies only to Heaven," and "the injured Party must
144
judge for himself, when he will think fit to make use of that Appeal."
Thus, by the late seventeenth century, to be judge in one's own case was
an idea associated not only with judges but also more generally with all
persons in a polity, whether subjects or sovereigns, and on this basis, it
had become an essential means of analyzing arbitrary power and ajustification for revolution. Hence, the ease with which Holt could turn from
Coke's report of Bonham's Case to a theoretical discussion of arbitrary
power and "the dissolution of government."
Even more revolutionary than the political philosophy Holt had assimilated was the use to which he put it. He had participated in the
Revolution of 1688 as a legal advisor to the Lords, as a member of the
Convention of 1689, and, indeed, as a manager on behalf of the
Neither would I be thought to encourage Princes to stretch their Power to the
utmost limits, nor yet to stir up Subjects to take Arms as soon as ever they think
themselves injured, since the Populace is but too apt, where they are left to be

their own Judges, to pronounce Sentence in the[i]r own favour.
James Tyrrell, Patriarcha non Monarcha, supra note 51, at 123 (sig. 16). With an even

greater caution he wrote: "Our Author [Filmer] will have no particular man to beJudg in
his own Cause. I grant it, if byJudg he means Executionter] too, by publick resistance." Id.
at 218 (sig. P5). In criticizing Filmer, Sydney wrote that:
[H]e might have remembered, that having affirmed the people could notjudge of

the disputes that might happen between them and kings, because they must not
be judges in their own case, 'tis absurd to make a king judge of a case so nearly
concerning himself, in the decision of which his own passisions and interests may
probably lead him into errors.
Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government 395 (iii.14) (Thomas G. West ed.,

1990). Of course, these positions were debated even before Hobbes wrote on the subject.
Hunton devoted a section of his Treatise to the question: "Who shall be the Judge of the
Excesses of the Monarch?" [Philip Hunton], A Treatise of Monarchy 23 (I.ii.7), in 9
Harleian Miscellany, supra note 107, at 332.
140. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 476 (II.xix.240).

141. Id.
142. Id. at 476 (II.xix.241).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 477 (II.xix.242).
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Commons in their conference with the Lords about James II's "abdication. ''145 In 1702, still having an attachment to the principles of the
Revolution, Holt recognized that these principles could have general application-that many of the objections to unlimited monarchical power
could, if stated generally, also apply to unlimited parliamentary power.
Accordingly, the theory that Locke in the seventeenth century had developed in response to claims on behalf of the Crown, Holt in the eighteenth century employed against the legislature. Like Defoe, who reminded the Commons of "We the People," and, perhaps, like Locke
himself, who commended his "cosin" for what he "did for the publick,"
Holt recognized that the most prominent threat to liberty lay elsewhere
than it had in the past and that the most efficacious response would come
from beyond the courts and other governmental institutions.
III.

HOLT ON SOVEREIGN POWER AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

In arguing that the Mayor of London could not be both judge and
party, Holt cited Bonham's Case,146 and he therefore has often been assumed to have revived the judicial voiding of statutes envisioned by
Coke's report of that earlier decision. 14 7 In his own manuscript of his
opinion, however, Holt took a rather narrow view of Bonham's Case. Far
from having illusions about the power of the courts, he understood and
accepted their very limited role, and he thereby reached conclusions
about judicial review consistent with the ideas of sovereignty implied by
his modern account of natural law.
A.

Enforcing the Acts of a Body with Sovereign Power

The modern natural-law theory seemed to require deference to acts
of a body with sovereign power. Already at the end of the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin had given an account of sovereignty, with which Holt was
familiar, 148 and in the seventeenth century, the more modern, naturallaw theorists also explained sovereignty or, at least, a closely related notion of supremacy.' 49 For example, Locke justified revolution with a theory that ordinarily required obedience. In some circumstances, according to Locke, the natural law of preservation permitted resistance to
government: "[t]he Community perpetually retains a Supream Power of say145. In his capacity as manager for the Commons, Holt-not yet ajudge-defended
the use of the word "abdication" on the ground that "the Government and Magistracy is
under a Trust, and any Acting contrary to that Trust is a Renouncing of the Trust." The
Debate At Large, Between the Lords and Commons ...Relating to the Word, Abdicated,
and the Vacancy of the Throne 12 (LondonJohn Morphew 1710) [hereinafter Debate at
Large] (Feb. 5, 1689).
146. 8 Co. Rep. 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.1610).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
148. See supra note 104.
149. In contrast to the word "sovereignty," the term "supreme power" had the
advantage of not suggesting that such power was located exclusively in the monarch.
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ing themselves from the attempts and designs of any Body, even of their
Legislators ...

."150 Yet even though the natural law of preservation

sometimesjustified revolution, it otherwise implied that "there can be but
one Supream Power, which is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and
must be subordinate."' 5 1 Having been established to preserve liberty, the
legislative was "the Supream Power," and therefore until the legislative
breached its trust or government was otherwise dissolved, the enactments
of the legislative had to be obeyed:
In all Cases, whilst the Government subsists, the Legislative is the
Supream Power. For what can give Laws to another, must needs
be superiour to him: and since the Legislative is no otherwise
Legislative of the Society, but by the right it has to make Laws
for all the parts and for every Member of the Society, prescribing Rules to their actions, and giving power of Execution, where
they are transgressed, the Legislative must needs be the Supream,
and all other Powers in any Members
or parts of the Society,
1
derived from and subordinate to it. 52
In the absence of a dissolution of government, natural law required conformity to the laws made by the "Legislative," which in England was comprised of the King, Lords, and Commons acting together. Its laws were
binding on "all other Powers in any Members or parts of the Society."
Although probably known to Holt through Locke's Two Treatises, this understanding of the legislative and its supremacy was commonplace in late
153
seventeenth-century England.
In accord with such a perspective, Holt clearly stated that an act of
Parliament was not subject to judicial review. One of his colleagues,
Baron Hatsell, is reported to have said not only that the Mayor's being
judge and party was "against natural justice" but also that "an Act of
Parliament against natural equity, [such] as to make one a Judge in his
own cause, would be merely void."' 5 4 Holt, however, appears to have disagreed with Hatsell's comments about "natural equity." Independent of
the question whether the Mayor could be judge in his own case, Wood's
lawyers argued that the particular act of Common Council under which
Wood had been sued was "contrary to the law of England and right reason."' 55 Holt responded by reminding Wood and his lawyers that this
objection had already been put to rest in a recent case involving another

150. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 413 (II.xiii.149).
151. Id. at 412-13 (II.xiii.149).

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 413-14 (II.xiii.150).
See id. at 412 (editor's note).
City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 672, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1593-94 (1702).
12 Mod. at 673, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1594; Ms. Report of City of London v. Wood, City

of London Record Office, City Extracts Vol. I, item 33 at fol. 2v. In both the oral and the
written versions of his opinion, Holt discussed this issue in connection with the question
whether Wood should have been allowed to wage his law.
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victim of London's shrieval nominations. 15 6 In the course of asserting
that the act of Common Council had already been adjudged to be equitable and in accord with right reason, Holt distinguished it from an act of
Parliament:
This then being a just act enacted by a legal authority is as obligatory to the party as if it had the sanction of an act of
Parliament. I do not say it is of as high nature as an act of
Parliament, for that binds absolutely without any dispute to be
made of its justice or equity, but this binds sub modo ifjust and
reasonable, but when it appears to be so, the obligation then is
absolute, and the party hath no way to avoid it, but is bound as
much to submit
to it as if imposed by the legislative authority of
15 7
the kingdom.
Whereas an act of Common Council or other by-law could be avoided if
unjust or unreasonable, an act of Parliament "binds absolutely without
any dispute to be made of its justice or equity."
Later in his opinion, Holt explained this distinction in terms of sovereignty. The first exception to the proceedings in the Mayor's Court
was: "That the Mayor and Aldermen as being members of the corporation to which the forfeiture is given, are incapable of beingjudges."' 58 In
responding to this objection, Holt argued that corporations such as the
City of London established their own laws and enforced these in their
own courts to facilitate the governance of the kingdom, and in making
this argument, Holt described the standards forjudicial review of the acts
of such corporations. Unlike acts of bodies with sovereign power, acts of
bodies without this power, such as the City of London, were subject to
judicial review by King's Bench:
But I am of opinion that their being members of the City is
no impediment to their being judges in this case. Which will be
very evident if the corporations of cities and populous towns be
considered in their nature and end. In their nature they are
communities politic and civil societies invested with a legislative
authority that shall bind all the members and all others inhabiting or maintaining any commerce within the limits of their city
or town. For a corporation as such may make by-laws.
Hob [bart's Reports]. 21 [0]. Norris v. Staps. But indeed they have
156. See City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. at 676, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1596; British Library,
Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 68r.
157. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 68r. According to a printed report,
Holt said:
[E]very by-law is a law, and as obligatory to all persons bound by it, that is, within
its jurisdiction, as any Act of Parliament, only with this difference, that a by-law is
liable to have its validity brought in question, but an Act of Parliament is not; but
when a by-law is once adjudged to be a good and reasonable by-law, it is to all
intents as binding to those that it extends to as an Act of Parliament can be.
12 Mod. at 678, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1597.
158. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 83r; see supra text accompanying
note 114.
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not a sovereign power. Therefore all their acts of Common
Council or by-laws are subject to the review of the kings courts,
which [acts] are so far valid as they are agreeable to law and right
reason, and if contrary to either they are ipso facto void. 15 9
Acts of the City of London and other corporations-bodies that "have not
a sovereign power"-were "subject to the review of the kings courts" according to the standards of "law and right reason, and if contrary to
either they are ipso facto void."
Nonetheless, as to some matters, the City of London and other corporations exercised power on behalf of the state:
But as to those matters that they are to perform with that subordination to the government of the kingdom or state of which
they are member[s], they act as a state or commonwealth. [Volume] 4 [of Coke's] Institutes [at page] 249, speaking of the Common Council of London saith, this court hath some resemblance to the High Court of Parliament. It consisteth of two
houses (I suppose of two states of men) the one Mayor and Aldermen, the other of such as be of the Common Assembly resembling the whole commonalty of London. In this court they
have power to make constitutions and laws for advancement of
trade and traffick, for the better execution of the laws and stat160
utes of the realm, so as these laws be not contrary thereunto.
159. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fol. 84r. (There is a blank space in the
manuscript following the first sentence, which may signify either a paragraph or, more
probably, a missing citation. Following the word, "communities," the copyist who prepared
Additional Ms. 35,980 added a comma, which assumes one of two interpretations. See
British Library, Additional Ms. 35,980, at fol. 12v. I follow this copyist, however, in
rendering as "they" in the last sentence what Holt mistakenly wrote as "that.") In Norris v.
Staps, it was said:
For, as reason is given to the natural body for the governing of it, so the body
corporate must have laws as a politick reason to govern it, but those laws must
ever be subject to the general law of the realm as subordinate to it. And therefore
though there be no proviso for that purpose, the law supplies it. And if the King
in his letters patents of incorporation do make ordinances himself, as here it was
(as aforesaid) yet they are also subject to the same rule of law.
Hob. 210, 211, 80 Eng. Rep. 357, 358 (C.P. 1616). According to Coke, in The Chamberlainof
London's Case it was said:
It appears by many precedents, that it hath been used within the City of London
time out of mind, for those of London to make ordinances and constitutions for
the good order and government of the citizens, &c. consonant to law and reason,
which they call Acts of Common Council. Also all their customs are confirmed by
divers Acts of Parliament, and all such ordinances, constitutions, or by-laws are
allowed by the law, which are made for the true and due execution of the laws or
statutes of the realm, or for the well government and order of the body
incorporate. And all others which are contrary or repugnant to the laws or
statutes of the realm are void and of no effect ....
5 Coke 626-63a, 77 Eng. Rep. 150, 151 (KB. 1590). Note that in these respects, Holt's
account ofjudicial review followed precedent.
160. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fols. 83v-84r. The next paragraph
began:
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As to these matters that they perform "with that subordination to the government of the kingdom or state" and in which they act "for the better
execution of the laws and statutes of the realm," a corporation was subject
only to the limitation that its regulations "be not contrary thereunto."
Clearly, Holt understood the idea ofjudicial review, whether measured by
"right reason" or by the "laws and statutes of the realm," but he did not
consider it applicable to an act of Parliament-an act of a body with sovereign power-"for that binds absolutely without any dispute to be made
of its justice or equity."
Thus, it was no coincidence that when Holt came to discuss Bonham's
Case, he did not mention standards of "right reason," "equity," or 'justice," or the possibility that a statute might be "void" or subject to judicial
"review." Instead, he cited Bonham's Case merely for the proposition that
Parliament could not make a man judge in his own case:
It is true that saying [in] 8 [Coke's] Rep [orts] 118 Bonhams
Case may seem to be carried too far, that an act of Parliament
can't make a man to be judge in his own cause, yet it is not so
harsh a saying as some may imagine, but it is a true and orthodox proposition, for ajudge and a party are in their nature and
institution different and distinct, for the being of the one doth
necessarily exclude the other. Therefore an act of Parliament
that should make a man to be ajudge in his own case would be
an absolute contradiction .... 161
Although the printed reports of this passage indicate that Holt went on to
say that such acts of Parliament would be void, his own account said nothing of this and instead suggested that either the statute would have to be
construed to avoid the contradiction or else "government would be
dissolved." 162
The end of this institution is the good government of the city or town, and
for which these corporations have time immemorial in all governments been
found to be very necessary. Bodin [in his] de Republica. Lib 3 ca[p] 7. saith they
are so essential to all good governments whether monarchical, aristocratical or
democractical that they cannot subsist without them, but they are utterly
repugnant to all tyrannical or oppressive administrations. In a large dominion
territory it is impossible for the government or the legislative authority thereof to
attend [to] the affairs of the cities and great and considerable towns in the
kingdom so as to make provision for all emergencies. Therefore for the peace
and tranquility of these places and for their support upon which the welfare of
the kingdom doth much depend it is indispensibly necessary that this should be
under a more nice inspection.
Id.
161. See supra text accompanying note 127.
162. For his opinion delivered from the bench, see supra text accompanying note 3
and supra note 103. Three months before Holt's opinion in City of London v. Wood, Defoe
wrote: "That Reason is the Test and Touch-stone of Laws, and that all Law or Power that is
contradictory to Reason, is ipso Facto void in itself, and ought not to be obeyed." [Defoe],
Original Power, supra note 24, at 3. In the mid-1690s, when defending the jurisdiction of
King's Bench from the Lords' claim of privilege, Holt is reported to have said that the
judges "adjudge things of as high a nature every day; for they construe and expound Acts
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Holt's narrow treatment of Bonham's Case-as requiring interpretation to avoid the contradiction-reflected not only a realistic appraisal of
the extensive power of Parliament but also a clear understanding of the
modern natural-law theory and its implications for sovereignty. Familiar
with the works of both Bodin and Locke, Holt argued that, "[t]o prevent
the great inconveniences that ensued from the mere state of nature, men
formed themselves into civil societies and did resign up themselves to a
state of subjection." 163 Accordingly, Holt recognized that acts of
Parliament were the acts of a body with "sovereign power."' 64 Judicial
review-"the review of the kings courts"-was what courts did to enforce
such acts and other law, plus, in some circumstances, right reason, but
judicial review could not defeat acts of Parliament. The only power to
defeat an act of a body with "sovereign power" lay, not in the judiciary,
but presumably in those who had originally given that sovereign power.
B.

The Implicationsfor the Acts of Bodies Without Sovereign Power

If, according to Holt in City of London v. Wood, the acts of a body with
sovereign power bound the judges "absolutely," then, perhaps, the acts of
other bodies might not bind the judges. For example, an act of one
House of Parliament-whether the Lords or the Commons-was not, by
itself, an act of a body with sovereign power and therefore might not be
considered law. This possibility is confirmed by Holt's other opinions, for
City of London v. Wood was decided amid a series of cases in which the
Lords and then the Commons used claims of privilege to interfere with
the role of the courts. In these cases, Holt simultaneously rejected the
parliamentary usurpation of the judicial function of the courts and developed the idea that judges had to adjudicate-that they had to apply the
law and distinguish it from such things as were not law.
Holt first challenged the abuse of parliamentary privilege in the
1690s, following the indictment of "Charles Knollys" for the murder of his
brother-in-law. Knollys claimed in abatement that he was the Earl of Banbury, that the indictment should have identified him by his title rather
than his name, and that therefore the indictment contained a misnomer.
He also petitioned the Lords that he was a peer and that therefore they
alone could try him. Although the Lords resolved that his earldom was
spurious, in 1694 King's Bench quashed the indictment. Holt explained
this refusal to defer to the Lords by pointing out that King's Bench had to
consider the claim of a peerage in order to decide the plea of a misnomer, and that the Lords had not decided Knollys's claim of a peerage in
either their judicial or their legislative capacity. More generally, Holt obof Parliament, and adjudge them to be void." Rex v. Knollys, a.k.a. the Earl of Banbury,
Skin. 517, 526-27, 90 Eng. Rep. 231, 236 (KB. 1694). Curiously, this opinion is missing
from those of Holt's manuscript opinions known by me to be extant.
163. See supra text accompanying note 130.

164. For his knowledge of Bodin, see supra note 160; for his knowledge of Locke, see
supra text accompanying notes 116-122 & 129-136.
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served that "every law which binds the subjects of this realm, ought to be
either the common law and usage of the realm, or Act of Parliament,"
and a mere resolution of the Lords was neither. 16 5 "[T]hough he had all
respect and deference for that honourable body, yet he sat there to ad166
minister justice according to the law of the land."
In 1702, in City of London v. Wood, Holt again, in effect, condemned
the abuse of parliamentary privilege. While acknowledging that judges
had to enforce acts of Parliament, Holt suggested that Parliament could
not make a person judge in his own case or allow a person to do what
seemed fit in his own eyes. He thereby seemed to question the
Commons' imprisonment of the Kentish Petitioners for breach of privilege-what could be viewed as the Commons' attempt to prohibit by a
claim of privilege what was not prohibited by law and to exercise a judicial power without the sanction of law, indeed, to do this in their own
case.
Shortly after deciding City ofLondon v. Wood, Holt dissented in a pair
of related cases-among the most famous of his career-and in so doing,
he forcefully rejected two attempts by the Commons to usurp the role of
the judges and to exert power without law. In Ashby v. White,' 6 7 Matthew
Ashby sought damages from the Mayor and constables of Aylesbury, who
had prevented him from exercising his right to vote in a parliamentary
election. Following a verdict for Ashby, the defendants moved in arrest of
judgment that it was a privilege of the House of Commons to resolve
disputed elections and that an elector could not bring an action for the
denial of his right to vote unless the House of Commons first decided
that he had such a right. 168 In 1703, Holt's colleagues were swayed by
such arguments, but Holt dissented "long and learnedly ... with some
Vehemence."' 6 9 Holt argued, among other things, that existing law did
not permit the House of Commons to exercise judicial power over individuals' complaints: "The House of Commons cannot take cognisance of
particular men's complaints; . . .in regard the law hath provided for it
[i.e., Ashby's cause of action], it is to be pursued in the ordinary and common methods of justice .... ,"70 Nor, indeed, could Ashby's cause of
action be barred by parliamentary privilege: "That certainly can never be
esteemed a privilege of Parliament which is incompatible with the rights
of the people, which is to have reparations for the injuries that are done
165. Rex v. Knollys, Skin. at 526, 90 Eng. Rep. at 236.
166. Id. Later, the Lords called Holt before them for an explanation. Holt bluntly
responded that the judgment could be properly questioned by means of a writ of error, but
that he was not to be questioned in an extrajudicial manner. See 1 Ld.Raym. at 18, 91
Eng. Rep. at 909.
167. 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (1703).
168. 2 Ld. Raym. at 941, 92 Eng. Rep. at 128.
169. 2 Bishop Burnet's History of His Own Time 367 (London 1734); see also 14 A
Complete Collection of State Trials 695 (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C. Hansard 1812)
[hereinafter State Trials].
170. Judgements, supra note 103, at 26.
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to their fights and franchise, in the ordinary and common method of
justice .. ."171 If Ashby's case was to be relegated to a decision by the
House of Commons on a question of privilege, this method of proceeding would have to be compatible with "the rights of the people." As Holt
emphasized in the last sentence of his opinion, it would have to be justified "either by statute law or common law." 172 Perhaps encouraged by
Holt's dissent, Ashby sought a writ of error and eventually, in January
1704, was vindicated by the House of Lords. 173 In response, the
Commons declared Ashby guilty of a breach of privilege and declared
that anyone who made a claim similar to Ashby's or who provided legal
assistance for such a claim would also be guilty of a breach of privilege. 174
The related case occurred when John Paty and four other Aylesbury
electors interpreted Ashby's victory in the Lords as a precedent and
pressed similar actions. 175 As it had threatened, the House of Commons
promptly imprisoned the plaintiffs and attempted to imprison their legal
advisors. 176 In 1705, upon a writ of habeas corpus, only Holt, of all the
judges, urged that the Commons could not keep the Aylesbury electors in
prison for breach of privilege. Among other things, he argued that by
bringing an action in one court, King's Bench, the electors could not
have violated the privileges of another court, Parliament, and that if the
Commons wished to make something a privilege that was not previously a
privilege, they, together with the Lords and the king, would have to pass a
statute to this effect:
For if this commitment in the case of these men shall be
determined to be warranted by the laws and customs of this
realm, it will be a rule in all other cases within the same reason,
which is in truth when either House of Parliament shall make a
menacing declaration that whoever shall presume to do such or
such acts, (though in themselves never so legal or justifiable,)
shall be judged and esteemed to be an infringer or transgressor
of the privilege of that House, and so to be subject to the censure thereof:-which proceeding is not according to the Constitution of the Kingdom, which admits no such power or authority
171. Id. at 35.
172. Id. at 36.
173. 17 H.L. Jour. 369 (Jan. 14, 1704) and 527-34 (Mar. 27, 1704); 14 State Trials,
supra note 169, at 799 (Jan. 14, 1704). Note that Holt was asked by the Lords to help draft
their Report. See 17 H.L. Jour. 386 (Jan. 27, 1704). In their famous resolutions, adopted
after receiving the Report, the Lords said, inter alia, that the votes of the Commons were
"in effect to subject the law of England to the Votes of the House of Commons." 14 State
Trials, supra note 169, at 799 (Mar. 27, 1704).
174. See 14 State Trials, supra note 169, at 775-78 (Jan. 26, 1704). Among the
members of the Commons who argued that Ashby had not violated the privileges of the
House was Peter King. See id. at 769-71.
175. See Queen v. Paty, Holt, K.B. 526, 90 Eng. Rep. 1189.
176. See 14 H.C.Jour. 444 (Dec. 5, 1704); 14 State Trials, supra note 169, at 800. One
of the plaintiffs' lawyers, Nicholas Lechmere, escaped capture through a back window with
quick use of his bedsheets and a rope. See id. at 810.
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to be exercised
and administered but by the whole
17 7
Legislature.
In other words, the commitment of the five Aylesbury electors was justified neither by custom ncr by an act of a body with sovereign power, and
therefore it was not authorized by law. Only an act of the whole legislature-an act of Parliament-could diminish a subject's liberty or
property:
Neither House of Parliament hath power, no, not both together, to dispose, limit, or diminish the liberty or property of
the subject, because by law (which is superior to the actions or
determinations of either House,) that liberty and property is established, and cannot be diminished or infringed by a less[er
the
authority than the Legislature of the kingdom, which is 178
Queen, the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament.
Like Holt's enforcement of acts of Parliament, his refusal to enforce the
act of a lesser authority if it would "diminish the liberty or property of the
subject" reflected his understanding of sovereign power. Although
hardly a restraint on acts of Parliament, this deliberate disregard of acts
of a lesser authority at least avoided judicial enforcement of arbitrary
179
power.
Perhaps recalling the scenes of legislative intimidation of the judiciary he had witnessed so often, Holt began his dissenting opinion in Paty's
Case by noting that he was at a "disadvantage" in "seeming to encounter
any act of the House of Commons."' 8 0 Holt said that "every Englishman
must be very fearful of giving any offence to so great and venerable a
177. Judgements, supra note 103, at 43. For a similar report of Holt's oral opinion,
see 14 State Trials, supra note 169, at 857. Holt also made arguments about the right of
the House of Commons to judge its own privileges. According to a rather condensed
report, Holt said that "to make them, or any Court, the final judges of them, exclusive of
everybody else, is to introduce a state of confusion, by making every man judge in his own
cause, and subverting the measures of alljurisdictions." Regina v. Paty, 2 Salk. 503, 504, 91
Eng. Rep. 431 (K-B. 1705).
178. Judgements, supra note 103, at 43.
179. Locke had written: "When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make
Laws, whom the People have not appointed so to do, they make Laws without Authority,
which the People are not therefore bound to obey .... " Locke, Two Treatises, supra note
32, at 456 (II.xix.212); see also id. at 400 (II.xi.134). Indeed, according to Locke, the law
making power could not be delegated.
The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands ....
The power of the Legislativebeing derived from the People by a positive voluntary
Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed,
which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can
have no power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other
hands.
Id. at 408-09 (II.xi.141).
180. Judgements, supra note 103, at 42; see also 14 State Trials, supra note 169, at
857. Even before he became ajudge, during the 1679 impeachment of the Earl of Danby,
Holt's conduct as counsel to the Earl made him the object of legislative displeasure. See
ChiefJustice Holt, The Law, May 1875, at 3-4.
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body, and must think himself very unfortunate to fall under such circumstances as might in anywise contribute thereunto." Yet "there is one thing
that doth overrule me, which I do fear more than all the evils and calamities that can befall me in this world, which is my own conscience, the
dictates whereof I ought always to obey."118 In this, Holt said much about
parliamentary power-as did his brothers, who refused to release the

prisoners.
CONCLUSION

For the litigants in City of London v. Wood, the decision of Holt and
his colleagues was hardly the last word on the dispute. Shortly after

Wood's victory before the royal judges, the City again brought an action
against him in the name of the Mayor, commonalty, and citizens-but
this time in the Sheriffs' Court. Following what could not have been an

inexpensive struggle, WooA eventually failed to prosecute a writ of error
with effect, and he thereby not only lost his case but also left an unfortunate clockmaker who had posted bond for him to face years of convo18 2
luted litigation.
For the City of London, the decision against it in 1702 was no obstacle to its collection of penalties, whether from Wood or others. Although
the City promptly sued Wood in the Sheriffs' Court in the name of the

Mayor, commonalty, and citizens, in 1703 it legalized proceedings in the
Mayor's Court by enacting that fines for refusing shrieval nominations
181. Judgements, supra note 103, at 42-43.
These election cases are suggestive of Holt's understanding of the relationship of the
people to their representatives. Another case of Holt's involving the right to vote was
Regina v. Soley, in which Holt, on a motion for arrest of judgment, held that defendants
seeking to vote for a bailiff were not guilty of a riot. See British Library, Additional Ms.
35,980, at fol. 95v, also reported at 2 Salk. 594, 91 Eng. Rep. 503 (K.B. 1707).
182. See the printed brief of the City before the House of Lords, Marwick v. Mayor of
London (H.L. 1708), copy available in City of London Record Office, P.D. 49.13; Markwick
v. Mayor, 2 Brown 409, 409-11, 1 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1030-31 (H.L. 1708). James Markwick,
Jr., posted bond that Wood would prosecute his writ of error with effect. See id. If the
Thomas Woods was the wealthy merchant mentioned above in note 109, then he had other
troubles, as is suggested by an action against him by the notorious Charles Knollys, Earl of
Banbury, for taking and detaining the Earl's wife, Mary, Countess of Banbury. See
Banbury v. Woods, 2 Salk. 705, 91 Eng. Rep. 595, 6 Mod. 84, 87 Eng. Rep. 841, 2 Ld. Raym.
987, 92 Eng. Rep. 157 (K.B. 1703-04). The Countess was Wood's daughter, who
apparently was seeking refuge from Knollys. See Peter King's shorthand notes, Bodleian
Library, Oxford, Locke Ms. fol. 36, at 81. Ironically, this was the same Charles Knollys
whose indictment for murder (after a successful duel with his brother-in-law) prompted
Holt to assert the jurisdiction of King's Bench to "adjudge" privileges of the House of
Lords. See Rex v. Knollys, a.k.a. the Earl of Bambury, Skin. 517,526,90 Eng. Rep. 231, 236
(K.B. 1694). It may be doubted whether Woods appreciated the honor of either
connection to Holt's constitutional opinions.
Incidentally, Peter King was present at the discussions of Banbuy v. Woods, and
apparently argued before Holt. See 2 Ld. Raym. at 988, 92 Eng. Rep. at 158. The case was
tried by Holt at Guildhall, where Woods and his wife were acquitted. See Locke Ms. fol. 36,
at 220.
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18 3
were to be collected "in the Name of the Chamberlain of the... City."
Indeed, Holt recommended this solution and even ended his opinion by
emphasizing that his arguments in favor of Wood posed no impediment
to the City's collection of penalties. After observing that "many acts of
Common Council" had appointed actions "to be brought by the Chamberlain" precisely in order "to avoid splitting upon this rock," Holt
concluded:
There will therefore be no harm done to the government of the
City, but it will put the City in mind of making use of their own
ancient officer. Appoint him by their acts of Common Council
to sue in the behalf of the City in the City courts and to have
recognizance acknowledged to him.... This particular case miscarrying, the act of Common Council may be fit to be reviewed
and made more practicable,184but as it now stands the judgment
given ought to be reversed.
Hardly for the first time in his career, Holt attempted to persuade the
was a small sacrifice for
losing party that "this particular case miscarrying"
85
the long-term benefits of the rule of law.'

Following the example of Holt, we too must conclude by turning
from the litigants to the larger issues at stake in City of London v. Wood.
Holt's opinion reflected the seventeenth-century philosophical development of the maxim against a person being judge in his own case. The
notion that Coke had applied to a party that had attempted to be its own
judge Holt also applied to such a party, and yet he went beyond this narrow, legalistic application and suggested the idea's broad, philosophical
implications for limits on government. Just as seventeenth-century philosophers had borrowed the idea-recently made prominent by a Chief
Justice-and had given it profound philosophical significance, so, now,
another Chief Justice took it back with its expanded implications and
gave it profound constitutional significance.
Nonetheless, the notion that one cannot be judge in one's own case
had little future in widely discussed constitutional analysis-and not just
because Holt's written opinion remained unpublished. As a metaphor
for political power, the notion of one who was judge in his own case was
awkwardly technical. It had played a crucial role in the development of
theories of limited government, but it was a legalistic conception of a
183. The Priviledges of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City 119 (London
1708). Incidentally, for numerous lists of persons who had not paid their fines and other
materials relating to the City's collection attempts, see City of London Record Office,

Sheriffs & Sheriffs' Court, Box 2.
184. British Library, Additional Ms. 34,125, at fols. 92v-93r. Earlier in his opinion, he
wrote that "the reason why it [i.e., prosecution on behalf of the City] is given to the
Chamberlain is because the chief court of the City is before the Mayor and Aldermen, and

therefore it is incongruous for him to sue as head of a corporation where he isjudge." Id.
at fol. 85v.
185. See, e.g., Regina v. Graep (KB. 1697), British Library, Additional Ms. 35,981, at
fol. 30r, quoted supra note 103.
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problem that could, after the development of such theories, be addressed
in their more direct and political terms.1 86 Accordingly, rather than discuss the implications of the government's being judge in its own case,
Defoe and other eighteenth-century writers tended to emphasize the
power of the people, the breach of contract or trust, and the dissolution
of government.
This contrast between the fate of the natural-law ideas accentuated
by Holt and the fate of those emphasized by Defoe suggests much about
the relationship between the dissemination of political ideas and the diffusion of political authority. Writing ajudicial opinion in a case involving
a mayor who was judge in his own case, Holt developed a subtle and
somewhat technical argument for a learned audience. The great publicist, Daniel Defoe, however, was well aware that he was emphasizing ideas
neither inaccessible nor unflattering to a large part of the nation and that
this had political consequences:
The meanest English Plow-man studies Law,
And keeps thereby the Magistrates in Awe;
Will boldly tell them what they ought to do,18 7
And sometimes punish their Omissions too.

Although Defoe probably was at least as interested in frightening the Tories as in alerting the "people" to their power, he seems to have understood that the power of the people depended in part upon the power of
ideas and that the power of some ideas depended upon their dissemination among the people.
Through the writings of Defoe and numerous others, the modern
natural-law theory had anything but a scanty or superficial reception. In
the past few decades, numerous historians and lawyers have argued that
natural-law ideas were of relatively minor significance for political debate
during the eighteenth century, particularly during the first half of the
century. They have argued further that when eighteenth-century Englishmen and Americans did discuss Locke in connection with politics, they
did so chiefly for the authority of the philosopher's reputation, without
much understanding of his arguments. As a result, it has become a staple
of recent historiography-challenged only in the last decade-that the
reception of modem natural-law and, particularly, Lockean ideas was
both narrow and shallow.' 8 8 Yet Somers's and especially Defoe's propa186. After Holt's opinion, the principle was used, among other things, to condemn
the Commons for the very type of abuse of power that had troubled Holt in Ashby v. White
and, presumably, also in City of London v. Wood. See, e.g., J.B., The Ancient and
Fundamental right of English Parliaments in General Asserted; and the Particular Right of
the Commons of England Justified ....
with Some Reflections ... in Answer to Sir
Humphrey Mackworth's Late Pamphlet, call'd Free Parliaments, &c., Preface (London, B.
Bragg 1705).
-187. [Defoe], The True-Born Englishman, in [Defoe], True Collection, supra note 59,
at 21.
188. See supra note 6. For responses, see supra note 8 and infra note 189.
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gation of such ideas (and not merely in the pamphlets discussed here)1 8 9
has been familiar to historians of literature for more than two centuries, 190 and Holt's application of these ideas in City of London v. Wood
suggests that the full breadth and depth of their significance has yet to be
explored.' 9 1
Together, Holt's opinion and Defoe's pamphlets speak volumes
about the intelligent appreciation of Lockean and other modern naturallaw ideas that could reach from bookshops to the bench. Ideas the journalist employed in some of the best-selling, most influential and effective
polemical tracts of the early eighteenth century, the ChiefJustice used in
an opinion carefully prepared for publication but still, ironically, in manuscript. Rather than paraphrase any particular version of the natural-law
theory with the precision of a philosopher, Holt, as one might expect,
applied the gist of the theory, and by combining ideas of Locke and other
writers (including, perhaps, Pufendorf) he revealed-even in the very
awkwardness of at least one of his combinations-the degree to which he
had thought about the problems he faced and the ideas that could solve
them. 192 Similarly, Defoe's departures from Lockean ideas can disclose
as much as his apparent borrowings. Although Defoe had a very broad
audience and restricted himself to untechnical arguments, he, like Holt,
analyzed Lockean and other ideas for himself and adopted these in ways
calculated to persuade his readers.
189. See, e.g., Defoe's rhyming exegesis of natural-law political theory in The True
Born Englishman (1701) andjureDivino (1706). Of the first of these, it has been said that
"[i]t is very probable, that from the invention of printing to the end of 1701, an equal
number of copies had never been sold of any book within the space of one year." 1 Lee,
supra note 92, at 45. By 1704, it had gone through more than twenty-one editions; Defoe
estimated that 80,000 copies of the small, cheap, pirated editions had been sold. See id.
See also the argument of Ashcraft and Goldsmith that Defoe may have been the
author of Vox Populi, Vox Dei (1709), also published under the title, The.Judgment of Whole
Kingdoms and Nations (1710)-best sellers that plagiarized arguments and even exact
language directly from Locke, Ferguson, Burnet, and others. See Richard Ashcraft &
M.M. Goldsmith, Locke, Revolution Principles, and the Formation of Whig Ideology, 26
Hist. J. 773, 776-800 (1983). Ashcraft and Goldsmith describe their work as a "concrete
illustration of the complex process by which political ideas are transmitted from one
generation to another." Id. at 773.
190. See, for example, the works of Chalmers, Wilson, and Lee, discussed supra note
92.
191. Defoe also drew upon the ideas of Bernard Mandeville and disseminated an
ameliorated version of Mandeville's notion that private vices could be public virtues.
Strangely, Mandeville scholars have taken little notice of Defoe's use of Mandeville's ideas,
including what appears to be the first extended borrowing from Mandeville. See Letter
from Sir Malecontent Chagrin [i.e., Daniel Defoe] to Mist's Journal (Feb. 7, 1719), in 2
Lee, supra note 92, at 100-04. For other uses by Defoe of ideas similar to Mandeville's, see
James V. Elliott, The Political and Social Thought of Daniel Defoe: A Study in the Rise of
Liberalism as an Ideology 299-301 (1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University).
192. For Locke, see supra text accompanying notes 116-122 & 129-132. For
Pufendorf, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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The response to Defoe's writing indicates that he had not misjudged
his audience. As already noted, many modern historians would have us
believe that early eighteenth-century Englishmen were not familiar with,
or even responsive to, Lockean and other modern natural-law ideas.
John Dunn, for example, has argued that Locke's Two Treatises were not
popular before 1750 and that citations to it were largely for the philosophical authority of Locke's name.1 93 Yet in 1701 the most influential
political journalist and one of the most prominent Whigs of the period
made use of Locke's ideas, and they did not publish Locke's name any
more than they did their own. Although not all who followed the parliamentary struggles of 1701 could read the pamphlet reworkings of Lockean ideas with as much sophistication as John Locke himself in his study
at Oates, the multitude of other readers clearly responded to the Lockean arguments of Defoe and the Whigs. 194 Most, surely, were blissfully
ignorant of ponderous natural-law tomes and hence oblivious to many
195
distinctions between the ideas of, for example, Pufendorf and Locke.
Yet they could appreciate a generalized and non-technical natural-law
theory of limited government, and this process of homogenization of the
ideas of the theorists, whether through ignorance or latitudinarianism, is
not insignificant. From Pufendorf and Locke, to Holt and Defoe, and
directly or indirectly to the variegated reading public, some general, nontechnical features of natural-law analysis were widely if also variously
received. 19 6
193. SeeJohn Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth
Century, inJohn Locke: Problems and Perspectives 45, 57 (John W. Yolton ed., 1969).
194. Put more bluntly, it was not the influence ofJohn Locke, but the persuasiveness
and usefulness of his ideas that allowed them to be so extensively received, and even his
ideas were assimilated and used merely as a part-albeit a very important part-of a more
general reception of natural-law ideas. For related though slightly different arguments
focusing on Revolutionary America, see Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary 1-38
(1987).
195. A more sophisticated process of homogenization occurred among the learned,
who when studying the moral theory of Grotius and Pufendorf, turned to Locke for an
acceptable political gloss.
196. These observations about the extensive reception of natural-law ideas in the first
years of the eighteenth century can be reinforced by an examination of the natural-law
basis of some of the language used during and shortly after the Revolution of 1688 and '89.
For example, in January and February 1689, there was much discussion of breach of
'contract," which was largely drawn from Grotius and other "civilians." As one participant
observed, this was "a Language that hath not been long used" in Parliament, "nor [is it]
known in any of our Law Books, or Publick Records. It is sprung up, but as taken from
some late Authors." Debate at Large, supra note 145, at 18 (statement of Earl of
Clarendon, Feb. 5, 1689). Although more traditional and less radical than the ideas of
Locke and Defoe, these natural-law ideas about contract illustrate the dissemination of
natural-law concepts.
What was true of discussions about contract was especially true of the analysis that
linked contract to abdication. During the meeting of the Convention Parliament, the
Commons resolved thatJames II was guilty, among other things, of "having Endeavoured
to Subvert the Constitution of the Kingdom, by Breaking the Original Contract between
King and People," of "having violated the Fundamental Laws, and having Withdrawn
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Just as some historians have been dismissive of the importance of
Lockean and other modem natural-law theory prior to the late eighteenth century, so too some have misunderstood Holt's use of that theory
in connection with judicial review. Notwithstanding the assumptions of
Plunknett, Corwin, Gough, and others, Holt was far from confused about
the possibility ofjudicial review. He said courts would "review" the acts of
corporations against the common law and the statutes of the realm and
also, in some instances, against right reason or equity. When discussing
acts of Parliament, however, he said nothing about statutes being void or
subject to judicial review. On the contrary, statutes were "absolutely"
binding and could not be questioned on grounds of equity or justice.
They were the acts of a body with "sovereign power," and the Chief Justice had a clear understanding ofjudicial review as a means of enforcing
rather than challenging such acts. Nonetheless, even Holt's judicial review implied some limitation on government, for by arguing that judges
were required to enforce the acts of a body with sovereign power, Holt
himself out of the Kingdom;" on this basis, the Commons concluded, James had
"Abdicated the Government" and "the Throne is thereby Vacant." Id. at 3 (Jan. 28, 1689).
Grotius had written about "a King or any other Superior Magistrate" who "shall abdicate or
manifestly desert the Government." Hugo Grotius, DeJure Belli et Pacis (I.iv.9), translated
in The Proceedings of the Present Parliament Justified by the Opinion of the most
Judicious and Learned Hugo Grotius . . . written for the Satisfaction of some of the
Reverend Clergy who Yet Seem to Labour under Some Scruples ... 13 (London 1689).
More to the point, Samuel Pufendorf had recently argued in his essay, de Interregnis,that
abdication was a ground for concluding that the contract was broken: "[Hie who Rules,
cannot be called in question for breaking his Contract,unless he either wholly Abdicate the
Care of the Government, or... manifestly, with evil Intention, depart from those Rules of
Governing, upon observance of which, as upon a Condition, the Allegiance of the Subjects
depends .... " Samuel Pufendorf, de Interregnis in Dissertationes Academicae Selectiores
344 (1675), as translated by [William Atwood], The Fundamental Constitution of the
English Government 61 (William Atwood trans., 1973) (London, J.D. 1690) (emphasis
added by Atwood, citing page 272 of another edition); see also James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca
Politica: Or, An Enquiry into the Ancient Constitution of the English Government 717
(London 1694). Reversing the order of this sort of analysis to conclude with James's
abdication and the vacancy of the throne, whoever formulated the Commons' resolution
shaped language that the Convention would debate and the nation would read. Thus, in
1689, as in 1701 and 1702, the ideas of natural-law theorists could be significant even for
those unfamiliar with their publications.
An objection to this account may be that much of the discussion about contract
during and following the Revolution of 1688 concerned an historical rather than a purely
abstract contract. Yet members of the convention appear to have been quite capable of
employing both an historical and an abstract notion of contract, and a great many of them
probably viewed the historical contract as the English exemplar of the theoretical one.
The danger of overemphasizing the incompatibility of the historical and the abstract
arguments about contract can be illustrated by Sir Robert Howard. He was the author of
an historical tract against arbitrary government, The History of the Reigns of Edward and
Richard II (London 1690) (circulated earlier in Ms.), to which he added a preface that
included a discussion of contract theory. See id. at xxiii-xxiv. Similarly, in the Convention
he argued from the example of Edward and Richard yet also cited Grotius to the effect that
"Compact is the origin of power." 2 Misc. State Papers from 1501 to 1726, supra note 53, at
402.
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suggested very different treatment of the acts of a body without that
power.
Holt's account ofjudicial review (as requiring judicial enforcement
of acts of Parliament) was not inconsistent with his account of extrajudicial restraints on government, for each could be derived from his theoretical assumptions about natural law. Natural law explained both submission to government and resistance to it. On the one hand, selfpreservation could be understood to imply that the acts of a body with
sovereign power-in England, the acts of Parliament-were laws that
could not be questioned and thus had to be enforced. This was a large
part of Holt's judicial review. On the other hand, self-preservation could
concomitantly be understood to imply that if government seriously
abused its power, it would be dissolved, and the people would have a
right to resist it. This was the right of revolution. Thus, Holt's judicial
review and the dissolution of government could both be understood to
197
have a basis in the law of nature.
The ChiefJustice's discussion ofjudicial review is suggestive of later,
American developments. Holt assumed that the acts of a body with sovereign power could be defeated only by those who gave this power and that
therefore the judges had to enforce such acts. Yet the same reasoning
that led Holt to enforce and defer to acts of Parliament led Americans
later in the century to reach similar conclusions about the acts of constitutional conventions. These were acts of bodies with a power the judiciary had to enforce.
Holt's analysis of corporations acting as states was somewhat similar
to the reasoning later applied to American governments. Precisely because corporations were bodies that "have not a sovereign power," their
acts were tested by judicial review against both law and equity, "and if
contrary to either they are ipso facto void." Yet there was an exception.
Corporate acts were not reviewable against equity if they were performed
with "subordination to the government of the kingdom or state"-if they
were done by a corporation acting "as a state or commonwealth." Such
acts shared the unquestionable character of acts of a body with sovereign
power and were reviewed only against the acts of the body that, indeed,
had sovereign power-that is, only against acts of Parliament.
This judicial review of corporations acting as states or commonwealths seems similar to the judicial review of American states or commonwealths when we recall what Holt tacitly recognized and Defoe made
explicit in prose and verse: "the Power of the People." On the basis of
this power, the people of America acted to dissolve their relations with
Britain and to constitute their own governments, stipulating what power
they relinquished to their governments and what they reserved. Like
Holt's corporations that acted as states or commonwealths, American
197. See generally Walter Berns,Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature,
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49.
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states or commonwealths acted with a power thatwas binding and not
subject to judicial review, except to ensure their conformity to the acts of
those who were the source or original of their power.
American judicial review partially solved the problem seventeenthcentury political philosophers had described in terms of the prohibition
against being both judge and party. Locke, among others, had asked "the
common Question... Who shall beJudge whether the Prince or Legislative
act contrary to their Trust?" 198 Locke answered that neither the people
nor their rulers could be judge in their own case. There was no judge on
earth between these parties, and therefore the people could only appeal
to heaven-that is, could only resort to arms. Americans, however, had
an intermediate solution, for they could first appeal to their judges.
Although a branch of government, the judiciary in America was not necessarily judge in its own case if it did not make the law it enforced and was
not beholden to those who did make the law. Thus, American judicial
review-based on written constitutions, the separation of powers, and the
independence of the judiciary-offered a partial, temporal solution to
the problem that, as Americans knew all too well, might otherwise require
an appeal to heaven. 199
With or without written constitutions enforced by judicial review, it
was apparent to increasing numbers on both sides of the Atlantic that
beyond constitutions were the people, and that they rather than the
judges were the ultimate guarantors of liberty. Holt argued that
Parliament was subject to the law of nature, by which, he suggested, the
people could hold it accountable. It was the threat of this "extrajudicial"
limitation rather than any judicial "review of the kings courts" that would
restrain Parliament. In this way, Holt applied to legislative power and
representative institutions the theoretical lessons seventeenth-century
philosophers had developed for use against monarchical power, and he
thereby ushered in the eighteenth century with a remarkably clear understanding of the new, post-Revolutionary constitutional debate. Although
not as bold as Defoe, who challenged parliamentary power in the name of
"We the People," Holt hardly failed to make himself clear when he more
discreetly adverted to the dissolution of government and the return of
men to the state of nature.

198. Locke, Two Treatises, supra note 32, at 476 (II.xix.240); see also supra text
accompanying notes 139-140.
199. For the earlier development a feudal context of some similar ideas, see Yale,
supra note 5, at 84, 95-96 & passim.

